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I

INTRODUCTION
A.

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The question which forms the core of this paper is the
relationship of faith and reason.

Is faith reasonable?

Does every aspect of that in which man believes need to fit
the requirement of reason?
faith reason?

Does reason support faith or

Is reason possible without faith?

To establish this relationship also means the establishment of the limitation of each.
faith?
at all?

How is kno-vrledge obtained?
Or why is reason necessary?

What is the area of
Why is faith necessary
To ans\ver these ques-

tions one must also ascertain the correct view of the world,
of man, of God, of revelation, and something of their mutual
relationships.
Since this theological controversy has been raised by
a number of recent theologians, it is to their writings one
must turn.

The three chosen by the author of this paper

are Karl Barth, Emil Brunner, and E.J. Carnell.

B.

JUSTIFICATION OF THE PROBLEM

Generally, Modernistic Liberalism believes that it alone
of all Christian theologies has subjected.every aspect of faith
to reason.

In fact, reason has so subjected the entire field

of religion which it surveys that even God has been brought

2

low.

In many instances, He has been considered as no more

than a figment of the human mind.
was good.

God was good, and man

Every day and in every way the world was get-

ting better and better.

An optimistic view of history was

this indeed in the light of selfishness and greed which
dominated the motives of the nations of the

wo~ld.

Though

it could survive the scandal of the early nineteenth century, liberalism could not survive the

hol~caust

of war.

From the smoking ruins of Central Europe there arose a new
theology, a theology which no longer asserted the divine
immanence nor the goodness of man.

Certainly the Second

World War has done nothing to dispel this new theology's
threatened sway over the theological world.
Since the basic error of t he liberals was
immanence, it is logical to expect that the basic
thesis of the new theology is transcendence and
discontinuity. Discontinuity of man with God replaced old continuity. "Where liberal theology
saw the goodness of God as continuous with the
highest human goodness and the fulfilment of life
as gradual sanctification and as the conservation
of value, nee-orthodoxy is more concerned with
the discontinuity between God's goodness and human sin, and visualizes the relationship of the
eternal to history as a dialectic one in which
God as the End fulfils man's desires and expectations only by disappointing them in their corrupted form." • • • Barth charges the liberals with
having made God in their own image. He himself
defines God as absolutely transcendent, the wholly other, the deus absconditus. Anything less
than wholly other is but an oversized man • • • 1

1. Edward J. Carnell, The Theologz Qf Reinhold Niebuhr
(Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1950~,
P• 3lo
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How does one know God?
both?

By faith or by reason?

Or by

If there is a line of demarcation between the two,

where does one begin and the other end?

More important

still, how does one know where this line of demarcation is?
Modern man demands the answers to problems.

It is not

sufficient for him to be told \.vhat is v-rrong , but that which
is right also.

How can faith be justified before him un-

less an appeal for faith is compelling?
C•

OBJECTIVES

The objectives of this research a r e as follovr s:
1.

A short biographical sketch of each individual

who has been discussed.
2.

The philosophical assumptions of each man were

3.

The theological viewpoint of the men i•Tas pre-

examinede

sented in the light of their respective philosophical assumptions.
D.

LIMITATIONS OF THE PROBLEM

Because of their outstanding success in their respective theological circles, this study has been limited to
the views of Karl Barth, Emil Brunner, and EaJ. Carnell
upon this problemo

These were chosen because of their pur-

ported claim to be heirs of the reformer s, particularly of
John Calvin.,

4

E.

DEFINITION OF TERMS

There can, at the present time, be no exact definition
of terms given8

The emphasis will be placed upon an induc-

tive study . of faith and reason in all of the authors, pe r mitting their usage to determine exac t meanings.
as a working

hypothesis~

However,

the following definiti ons are sub-

mitted since they are related so closely to the central
problem.

Some aspects of these definitions, no doubt, wi ll

apply to all of the men to be studied.
1.

Reason

The special mental faculty vrhich in thinking ideas of absolute completeness and unconditionedness ~ranscends the condition of possible
experience.
2.

Faith

Faith is the giving of oneself to be controlled by what commands trust and devotion. • .3
E.

METHOD OF PROCEDURE

The method of procedure has been limited to an inductive study of the writings of these meno

Only for purposes

of biography have other authors been consulted.

A short

biography of each individual has been included in order to
d emonstrate under what circumstances and what particular

2. Dagobert D. Rm1es, Dictionary Q£ Philosophz (New
York, Philosophical Library, n.d.), p. 264.

3. H(enry) N(els on) Vl(ieman) "Faith," An :&,qcycloQedia of Religion, compiled by ~ergilius Ferm (New York 7
The Philosophical Library, 1945), p. 270.
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background each has written.
Due to the limitation of the author of this thesis,
most of these studies have been made in authorized translations.

Both Barth and Brunner have written principally

in the German language, making this a necessity.
As much as is humanly possible, this researcher has made
an attempt to be objective.

All criticisms and suggestions

concerning the various authors have been made from the criteria which they themselves have declared valid.

It must

be noted however, that in all too many instances, this paper has fallen short of complete objectivity.
,

This inves-

tigator wishes to apologize to all who feel that their
viewpoint has not been fairly represented.

01~

The author can

only beg forgiveness on the basis of our common humanity.
All references quoted by this author from the Bible
have been taken from the American Standard Version of 1901.
For those quotations contained within quotations of other
authors, due reference must be made to that author's work.

CHAPTER

II

THE RELIGIOUS EXPRESSION OF ICARL BARTH
A.

BIOGRAPHY

Karl Bar t h qas been recognized as one of the outstandi ng contemporary theologians.

.AI;'ound his works and thought

have raged controversies which few men have experienced.
Barth was born i n 1886, in Ba s el, Switzerlandl son of Professor Fr itz Barth, author of a book on the chief problems
of the life of Jesus. 2 It has been stated that the typical
life of a Neo-Orthodox theologian could be traced from a
Conservative background to Liberalism to Neo-Orthodoxy.
is doubtful i f Barth vias a true

Conservative~

It

but the ear ly

influence of 1'1odern Liberalism is everywhere evident in his
writings.

Wi t hout accepting this viewpoint t h oroughly, Barth

could never have become the associate editor of the Ritschilian journal, Die Christliche Welt.3
Barth's university days were spent in Berne, Berlin,
Tubingen and Marburg. 4

After a ministry of two years at

1. J.L. Neve, A History of Christian Thought (Philadelphia, The MQhlenberg Press, 1946), II , 172.
2. Hugh Ross Mackintosh, Types of ~~ Theo~
(London, Nisbet and Co. Ltd., 19~), · p. 271.
3.

4.

Neve , QQ. cit. II, 172.

H(erbert) H(irsh,.;ald), "Karl Barth 7 11 Chamber's
Encyclopedia (New York, Oxford Univers1ty Press, 1950),
B, 141.
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Geneva (1909-1911) he accepted a pastorate at Safenwil
(Aargau).

It was during this pastorate in Switzerland that

the great First World War broke out , and, significantly, it
was here that radical changes were introduced into his theology.
It in no way discredits a man to examine the immediate
environment in which his thought was born.

Though a theo-

logical truth may be an eternal verity, yet its elevation
to the forefront of human thought usually took place in a
particular environment which was conducive of that thought.
An examination of that environment, moreover, often is able
to lead the examiner to a more critical and literal interpretation of what has been thought before him.
Until this time of radical change, Barth had been committed to an optimistic theology.

This is evidenced by his

committal to the Swiss Religio-Social movement of Hermann
Kutter and Leonhard Ragaz. 6 Reacting against this human
attempt to usher in the Kingdom of God, Barth wrote a paper
~

entitled,

Glaube

sn den

Persoenlichen QQit, in which he

stated that the kingdom of God is not measured by human achievement and progress, but rather in the terms of God's
Lordship.?
There is much which is similar in the historical and

6.

Neve·,

7.

Ibid. .

QJ2.•

ill· II , 172.
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political situations of Kierkegaard's day and that of
Barth's.8

Kierkegaard was stricken by the worldliness

which had smitten the Danish church of his day.

His dis-

position, whatever the cause, was anything but cheerful.
It was the extreme seriousness of life which impressed him.
This worldliness was caused, Kierkegaard believed, by the
extremely optimistic theology prevalent in the church at
that time.

This, he felt, was not at all warranted by the

act.u.al facts.

There were no omens which seemed to him to

declare that the church was ushering in the Kingdom of God.
Everywhere immorality prevailed, both inside and outside the
church.

Denmark had just engaged in a war with Germany and

had lost part of her riches and most productive territory,
Schleswig-Holstein, which added additional grief to his
troubled soul.
had lost a war.

A century later, in Barth's day, Germany
In addition, she lost all of her territor-

ial possessions in Africa and the islands of the sea.

The

rich Saar basin, with its wealth of natural resources, was
taken from her.

This \oJ'as in striking contradiction to the

philosophy of Hegel that it was to the Germans the world
could look for the ideal of absolute freedom.9

As in Den-

mark one hundred years before, a severe financial depression

8. Ewart Aubrey, Present Theological Tendencies (New
York, Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1936), p. 74.
9. G.W.F. Hegel 1 Lectures Qll the Philosoyh~ of History, trans. by J. Sibree (London, George Bell and
Sons, 1902), p. 354.

9

struck Germany.

This, coupled with the other disasters,

brought the realization of the futility of human effort
upon Barth.

Social idealism, he concluded, was only a dis-

illusionment.10
During his pastorate at Safenwill, Barth wrote his famous Commentary

QU

St, Paul's

Epistle~~

Romans. (1917).

In this commentary he sought to reinterpret Paul's teachings about God, man, and human destiny in the light of his
t\.,rentieth century surroundings. 11 This book gave him theological fame throughout the religious 'I.Y"orld.
In 1921 Barth became a university professor, first at
Gottingen, then Munster in 1925 and Bonn in 1930.

After

the rise of National Socialism in Germany, Barth was forced
to return to his native Switzerland.

His work for the con-

fessional church in Germany before he left proved to be the
backbone of its resistance in its struggle against Hitler.
It has been said that the famous Declaration of Barmen (1934)
was essentially his writing. 12 In Switzerland Barth was
appointed professor of theology at Basel, but at the close
of World vlar II, he again returned to Germany • 1 3

10.

Aubrey, ~· cit. p. 74.

11.

~.

12. H(erbert) H(irschwald), "Karl Barth," Chamber'~
Encyclopedia (New York, Oxford University Press, 19 0),
II, 141.
13. "Karl Barth," The Encyclopedia Americana (Ne,tl
York, Americana Corporation, 1952), III, p. 288.
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B.

REACTION AGAINST LIBERALISM

It has already been noted that Barth represents a reaction against Liberalism.

From Hegel's "Whatever is, is

right," Barth might be characterized by "Whatever is, is
wrong."

Both of these statements must, of course , be

rightly understood in the light of the philosophies which
they represent.

An allied statement characterizing Barth's

thought is that everything in the natural sphere of time
and space is relative.

This would i nclude man, his ethical

systems, and his attempts at systematization of thought.
Whenever a philosophy claims to be a relative philosophy the question must always
tive?

follow ~ ,

to what is this rela-

As far as considering this world relative, Barth is

in superficial agreement with

~dern

Liberalism, but when

the question is pushed further, we then see that there is
no real agreement, at least at this point.

Modern liber-

als, following in the legacy of Hegel, have made all human
endeavor relative to the yardstick of progress.
struggling spirit of man ascends the
values also ascend.

~ale

.As the

of progress, his

On the other hand, Barth vehemently

denied that there could be any scale of human achievement.
That although all is relative, it is relative not to man,
but to God.

Hegel sees the world composed of metaphysical

opposites which man gradually solves through the aid of infinite Spirit.
of progress.

As he solves these, he ascends the ladder
Barth denounces this deifying of man, stating

that these great contradictions cannot be solved by man,

11

but that man must rest content to let these reside within
the mysteries of God.
system of thought.

Hence, for man there is no complete

If he were to attempt this impossibil-

ity, man must either not account for all the facts, lapse
into idealism in order to make all the facts fit; or he
must be forced to give up.

Even the attempt at such a sys-

tem, Barth has argued, is sinful.
the tower of

Bab~l,

It is the building of

man ' s attempt to make himself master of

the situation, hence gods.

This attempt has been made be-

cause man basically has not trusted his Creator, willing
more to place trust in his own powers.

The difference then,

which is most striking between Hegel and Barth is that the
former has placed no limitations upon the ability of the
reason, while Barth has advocated that it is restricted and
limited.
C.

NATURAL

THEOLOGY

It would do well for us at this time to examine the
position of Barth as to the reliability of natural theology.

In this area of thought, he is noted for the pamphlet,

Nein, which he wrote in rejecting Brunner's qualified acceptance of naturaly-· theology.

Upon this point, Barth and

Brunner were separated and have never since been reunited.
Concerning natural theology, Barth wrote:
I certainly see -- with astonishment -- that
such a science as Lord Gifford had in mind does
exist, but I do not .see how it is possible for it
to ex~st. I am convinced that so far as it has

12

existed and still e!~sts, it owes its existence
to a radical error.
If man can learn nothing from his natural surroundings as
to the nature or even the possibility of God , then human
reason must be limited to that of the natural sphere. 1 5
At this point, _it might be noted that Barth is in full agreement with the epistemologies of both Hume and Kant.
But Barth has laid forth the claim that it is only to the
Word of God we can turn if one vtishes to possess certainty
about God.

In so turning away from and rejecting. the human

reason, Barth believed he was turning from the natural theology and dogma of the Catholic Church to a proper emphasis
as presented by the Reformers.
But the Reformation and the teaching of the
Reformation Churches stand in an antithesis to
"Natural Theology" \-thich is at once clear and instructive for both • • • that , however, in no way
alters the principle that the revival of the gospel by Luther and Calvin consisted in their desire
to see both the church and human salvation founded
on the Word of God alone, on God's revelation in
Jesus Christ, as it is atfgsted in the Scripture,
and on faith in the Word.
This abandonment of human reason, the abandonment of all
natural theology, is done purposely and deliberately by
Barth because they are unlike God.

God is absolute, while

14. Karl Barth , Ihg Knowledge of ~ ~ the Service
of ~ According to the Teaching of the Reformation
TGreat Britain, Charles Scribner's Sons , 1939) , p. 5.

15. Henry Nelson Wieman and Bernard Eugene Meland,
American· Philosophies 21. Religion (Nel.v York, Harper
a.nd Brothers, Publishers, 193 ), p. 79.
16.

Barth, QQ. cit. p. 8.
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his conception of all that can be called cosmos is limited
and relative.
I repeat, it does not mean the negation, the
denial or the depreciation of that which is not
God. But it does meant that this ±?tter factor is
criticized, limited and relative.
How can man know that there is a God?
heart of the Barthian theology.
of God.

This is the

One knows through the Word

In summary concerning this vital point we quote

Barth again,
Knowledge of the one and only God becomes
possible and real 7 because this does happen, because God does ar~se and makes Himself visible in
the world and distinguishes Himself !rQm the world
as its creator, thereby making the wor!g visible
and distinguishing it as His creation.
This message, this distinguishing Himself from the world,
can, in the final analysis, be called the Word of God.
Where does one find the Word of God?
make Himself known?

Where does God

The first place one would look would

logically and naturally be the Bible which has been known
as the Word of God throughout the centuries.

:t-1oreover, as

has already been noted, 1 9 it is to the Biblical teachings
that Barth has claimed to turn.

Let us examine in a pre-

liminary sketch what Barth has found of value in the Bible.

17.

Ibid., p. 16.

18.

Ibid., p. 15.

19.

Cf. Ante, p. 12 .
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D.

THE BIBLE

Barth's view of the Bible can be found in a series of
negative presentations in which he has presented what is
not to be found in the -Bible.
presentations is history.

The first of these negative

Whether the history which is

presented in the Bible is true history or not is really beside the point.

The real issue is this, that the Bible is

not primarily a history of events, events which can be resolved into a system.

Referring to those who have read the

Bible for the historical record contained therein, Barth
wrote:

"But the pleasure is short-lived.

The pictur·e, on

closer inspection, proves quite incomprehensible and flat
if it is meant only for history.n20
Biblical history in the Old and New Testaments is not really history at all, but seen from
above is a series of free divine acts and seen
from below a series of fruitless attempts to undertake something in itself impossible. From the
viewpoint of ordered development in particular
and in general it is quite incomprehensible--as
every religious teac~lr who is worth his salt
knows only too well.
Thus, even more forcibly, Barth has denied all meaning to
Biblical history.
Fundamental Protestantism, or the group of Protestant
20. Thomas s. Kepler ed.; Contemporary Religiouy
Thought (New York, Ab{ngdon-Cokesbury Press, 1941 ,
p.

134.

21. Karl Barth, The Word of Q.Q.9. ~ ~ ~ Qf. Man,
trans. by Douglas Horton (no location, The Pilgrim
Press, 1928), p. 72.
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believers generally known as Orthodox, together with the
Catholic Church, have generally believed that from the
Bible one must draw his doctrine and dogma about God.

This

is just exactly what the Bible has not purported to do.
It is not the right human thoughts about
God which form the content of the Bible, but
the right divine thoughts about men. The Bible tells us not how we should talk with God
but what he says to us; not how we find the .
way to Him, but how He has sought and found
the way to us; not the right relation in which
we must place ourselves to Him 2 but the covenant which He has made once and for all in
.Jesus Christ. It is this which is \>Tithin th2
Bible. The Word of God is within the Bible. 2
Certainly one would look for moral teaching vli thin the
Bible.

One would point to the great moral laws of God as

delivered to Moses upon the mountain of God as a primary
example. 23

The teachings of .Jesus upon the mountain would

cer t a i n 1 y b e a grea t co d e of mora l ~·ty.

24

Bu t Bar th seem ed

to give only the barest attention to these great principles
of law and instead has given the most weight and emphasis
upon those points which have always been difficult for Modern Aiberalism.

This, no doubt, was a vestige of his 1ib-

eralistic training.

He pointed to the places where God has

blessed men who committed terrible deeds, or even where men
were commanded by God to commit them.

22.

Kepler, QQ.

~. ,

23. Exodus 20:1-17.
24. Matthew 5 - 7.

p. 138.
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And in how many phases of morality the
Bible is grievously wanting! How little
fundamental information it offers in regard
to the difficult questions of business life,
marriage, civilization, and statecraft, with
which we have to struggle! To mention only
a single problem, but to us a mortal one:
hm-r unceremoniously and · constantly "\'Tar is
waged in the Bible! • • • Time and again the
Bible gives us the impression that it contains no instructions, counsels, or examples
whatsoever either for individuals or for
nations and ~overnments; and the impression
is correct. 2 ?
Of course, also basic to his criticism of the morality of
the Bible, is the concept which he has which is becoming
more evident with each quot ation , that the Bible is limited and relative because it too is a part of the cosmos.
It is obvious that the great commandments were limited to
a particular situation and are not applicable to the modern world .

But this is not only

t~ue

of Biblical ethics

but of all modern systems.
The world is full of morality, but where
have we really got with it? It is always an
exceptional condition--! had almost said , an
artificial dislocation of our will. It is no
new will. Steadily or intermittently, we apply ourselves to our morality--to our thrift,
let us say, to thought for our family 7 to efficiency in our vocation, to our patrlotism-and through it we lift ourselves above our
o'in real level and that of our fellow men. • •
Is the unrighteous , self-seeking, capricious,
world-will really struck at, much less overcome , by our withdrawing with our morality-seemingly a little to one side? Is it not our
very morality which prevents our discerning
that at a hundred other points we are the more
firmly fettered to that will? Does it not

25.

Kepler, QQ•

~. ,

p . 136.
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make us blind and impenitent toward the deep
real needs of existence? Is it not remarkable that the greatest atrocities of life-! think of the capitalistic order and of war-can justify themselves on purely moral principles? The devil may also make use of morality. He laughs ~t the tower of Babel which
we erect to him. 6
Of what value is the Bible?

It does not primarily

teach history , nor can it be used correctly for d o"gma, nor
can it be deduced to a system of ethics.

The truth of the

Bible, Barth has stated, lies in the fact that it points us
beyond history, beyond morality, beyond human dogma, to a
world which man cannot hope to find, the world of God. 27
What he meant by this statement must be left temporarily until we are able ta probe into Barth's meaning of the Word of
'

God.
E.

PHILOSOPHICAL ASSUMPTIONS

To summarize the argument or· Barth thus far presented,
it could be said that Barth believed that everything vlhich
is not God is limited, relative, and fallible.

This applied

to all that might be termed part of the world which included
the Bible and human reasoning.

There is nothing about the

world which can possibly give us knowledge of God.

Certain-

ty as a part of human attainment is therefore a useless attempt.

In the light of what has been gained thus far, one

would quickly wonder at Barth's own presentation.

Is it not

26.

Barth, The \'lord of God and the \vord of Man, p. 18.

27.

Kepler,~·

cit., p. 133.
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also a part of this same world as is nature and the Bible?
Is it not also a product of the human reason and thus fallible?
that.

Startlingly enough, Barth would agree to exactly
Everywhere while reading Barth, one is impressed by

the scrutiny he has given his mm works.

Reflecting upon

them again and again, he has often been caused to revise
and even to depart from much of his work in the past.
Impressive as Barth's work has been 1 it
is far from being beyond the reach of cr~ti
cism. Some camp-followers of the movement
have inclined to forget this, but the master
himself leaves us in no doubt. He criticizes
his own statements, often 2 by modifying them.
"To live is to change, a~ to be perfect is
to have changed often,tt it has been said; and
one fact which makes comprehension of his
thought so difficult is that in detail it
changes constantly. He warns us vehemently
against canonizing his results up to date.
He offers clear principles, definite ~Ssump
tions, but never a closed system • • •
Many have criticized Barth because he has claimed that his
is not a system of thought.

On the other hand, Dr. J.L.

Neve criticized Barth because he ha$ not system enough.

At

the time of the publication of the Credo in 1936, Neve insisted that Barth went through a fundamental change of
thought and could scareely be recognized as the same individual who had published the previous works of Barth.
Whereas in 1921 Barth virtually heaped ridicule on those who look for a Second Coming at
some distant future, he now speaks of Christ as

28. Hugh Ross Mackintosh, Types of Modern Theology
(London, Nisbet and Co. Ltd., 1949f, p. 2l54.
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our "future," our "hope" • • • Only at one fundamental point Barth remained the same: he
still rejects each and ev2~Y acknowledgment
of a theologia naturalis. ~
Ridicule has often been applied to Barth because of the
many inconsistencies conta-ined in his writings.

But to

thoroughly understand Barth's relativism, is to understand
with him that it is perfectly consistent to be inconsistent.
Barth cannot be understood at all unless it be understood
that everything he has stated has been stated in a framework of relativism.
Cornelius Van Til in his criticism of the Barthian
movement has assumed that Barth does have a system of thought,
in fact he has so stated in spite of Barth's denials. 30 However, Barth's definition of a system of thought would be
different from Van Til's.
Barth's main charge against other religious thought,
has been that they have attempted to construct the world
and God into a closed system of thought.

This would in-

clude the Catholics, the Liberal Protestants and the Conservative Protestants.

He charged that they have attempted

to marshal all the facts of history and of nature into their
thought.
ture.

Thus they have a philosophy of history and of na-

But to deny these assertions, as Barth did, that

history and nature can be resolved into systematic thought

29.
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so that men can

kn0\'1

the general pattern of all that has

happened and all that will happen is not in itself constructing another system.

The human reason, Barth has

charged, simply is not adequate to account for all the
facts.
But if one has denied reason, how is it possible for
there to be any presentation at all?

How can one even ex-

press ideas which can be grasped and understood by those
reading?
surd.

Some criticism of Barth has been just this ab-

What Barth has denied is not the

po"~Jrers

of compre-

hension and expression, but man's ability to account for
all the data which is at his disposal.

If one were to ask,

how could it be true if it did not account for all the facts,
Barth would reply, it is true because it does not account
for them for they are of such a nature as not to be accounted by man.

This can be done alone by God, and one

must trust implicitly in Him for all the final solutions.
This, Barth has stated, is the supreme value of the Bible.
And it is certain that the Bible, if we
read it carefully, makes straight for the
point where one must decide to accept or re +
ject the sovereignty of God~ This is the
new vrorld v!i thin the Bible • .)l
Before the examination of the critical point of study
of Barthian theology, the Word of God, his doctrine of the
church and of theology should be first understood.

31.
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a frame of reference as Barth's it is very difficult to see
how either can really exist.

Unless we understand thorough-

ly their function in the world, the meaning and the purpose
of the Word of God cannot be understood.

F.

THE CHURCH

The Church is a part of the world.

As much as one might

wi·sh otherwise, she cannot be extricated from her entangling

alliances with which she is bound.
And now the last point, that where the
Church is~ there it has an aim, the kingdom
of God. This goal of the Church is bound to
constitute a continuous restlessness. for the
men in the Church, whose action stands in no
relation to the greatness of this goal. We
must not allow Christian existence, that is
the existence of the Church, and theological
existence, to be spoiled by this. It may
well happen that we might want to drop the
hand that is put to the plough, when we compare the Church with its goal • • • If we really hope for the kingdom of God, then we shall
not be ashamed to discover in the concrete
congregation the one holy universal Church,
and then every individual w113 2not be ashamed
of his particular confession.
As a part of the world, the church is hindered in the
fulfillment of her future goal because she is in a lost and
damned state.
We know the Church only in its unliketo the Kingdom of God. The Church is,
as we saw, directly constituted by the fact
that the Kingdom of God has come near in the

~

32. Karl Barth, Dogmatics ill Outline, trans. by G.T.
Thomson (New York, Philosophical Library, 1949), p. 148.
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Epiphany of Jesus Christ, but only near, and
that we still live in time which is not eternity. The phenomenon of the hiddenness
of the body of Christ and th~ phenomenon of
the disunity of the one Church bring tb~t
fact very clearly before our eyes. • .3j
Her weakness is that of utter inability to be effectively
God-like.

But of course this is not what has made the church,

the church.

What has made the church is its relationship to

Christ.
• •• The homecoming of her own being, on the
ground of which alone she actually ventures
to proclaim, of course means for her the reversion to her proper being, which transcends
herself, to Jesus Christ her heavenly Head,
whom she confronts as His earthly body, bound
to Him as such, and yet as such distinct from
Him who possesses the Church in Himself~ but
not the Church Him in herself, between tlim
and Her there is no reversible, interchangeable, relationship as certainly as the relatio~~hip of master and servant is no reversible.
If the Church then is so sinful, so enmeshed with the inhibitions which the world has her bound, why is she in existence at all?

The central duty of the church, her only ex-

cuse for existence, is that of proclamation.
• • .Both according to the express declaration (Matt. xxviii. 18 f.), and according to
what we can learn from the New Testament about the actual practice of the Apostles,
this commission consists in witnessing by
means of the preaching of the Gospel and the
Administration of the Sacraments. No third
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action has a place beside these two, which
are in essence one, the ministerium verbi
divini • • • It is out of confidence in the
worth and relevance of this command, it is
out of the firm assurance that by pure proclamation and by the proper administration
of the sacraments more is achieved and better results are obtained in the solution of
just these pressing problems of life than
by the best-intentioned measures for aid,
action and enlightenment, that involve our
stepping outside of the bounds of this small
but mighty domain. • .3 5
Barth has brought to us forcibly that the Church's only reason for existence is the service which it can render to the
Word of God.

She has not been placed here in the world for

a moral example, not to teach any form of systematized · doctrine, but to proclaim.

In this act she performs the vital

function which Christ has commanded her •
• • • But this human activity of her is of
course primarily proclamation, and anything
else than the proper fulfilment of t~~t cannot be the purpose of dogmatics. • •
The church, even in her proclamation still remains a
creature of the world.

Through her own power, she has nev-

er been able to proclaim.

It is not her

proclaim, it is the Word of God.

OiY.n

word she is to

And yet as she attempts to

utter the Word which has been revealed to her by the sovereign act of God, it somehow becomes her own word.
Thus if human language claims to proclamation, that can only mean that it claims to
serve the Word of God, to point to its hav-
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ing previously been spoken through God Himself. That is God's Word, that sanctifies
the human pointer to bear witness to ·Himself, this it cannot take to itself. The
will on man's side here brought in question
can only be that of accepting a commission.
It goes decisively with what all true prophecy has discerned, that no man as such can
possibly utter the Word of God. If man's
language about God claims to be proclmation,
it claims to be not grace, but th3 service
of grace, the means of grace • • • 7
Barth has made it clear that not just any words stated
in a church are the Words of God.

One definite character-

istic of proclamation must be that its language is centered
in and phrased around the Holy Scripture.3 8 The proclaimer,
in the form of homily or exposition, has the task of pre ..
senting the promises of the Bible.

But his purpose is to

make the promises of the Bible vital, to have bearing upon
today, and to make them be interpreted in the light of our
own problem.

The scripture then is the proclaimer's pre-

supposition, while the "person called must be ready to make
the promise given to the Church comprehensible in his own
words to the men of his time.u39

One can readily recognize

the relativistic framework of this contention.

In fact it

is this view of reality which has made proclamation needful
if one were to accept Barth's point of view.

57.

37.

l..Q1g.. ' p.

38.

l12iQ.. ' p • 64.

39.

-Ibid. ·,

25
G.

DOGMATICS

Even as the principle task of the Church is proclamation, her principle theology is dogmatics.

Proclamation in

Barth's theology is prior to dogmatics, and as it has been
shown that proclamation and exegesis have vital bearing on
one another, so one might say that exegesis is prior to dogmatics.

But because exegesis involves the human element,

there is always the danger that exegesis will no longer be
exegesis, but the proclamation of the proclaimer.

Because

of the danger of this imposition of human ideas upon the
Word of God, proclamation· must be carefully scrutinized to
ascertain its usefulness to the service of the Word of God.
As the science of dogmatics is examined briefly, Barth's
definition of dogmatics should be carefully compared to those
of other theologians, either favorably or unfavorably.

It is

evident that Barth would disagree radically with the definition of dogmatics which Strong has given us •
• • • 'the systematizing of the doctrines as
expressed in the symbols of the Church, together with the grounding of these in the
Scriptures, and the exhibition, so f~~ as
may be, of their rational necessity. · 0
Barth's main disagreement as one could easily see, would be
in the effort to prove the rational necessity of certain doctrines.

Though doctrine might explain the certain phenomenon,

40. James Strong, Systematic Theology, quoted in H.
Orton Wiley, Christian Theology (Kansas City, Beacon
Hill Press, 1949) I, 28.
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it most certainly cannot be demonstrated as a rational necessity, for even the theology of dogmatics cannot explain
its necessity, for it is of another i.rorld.

Lange's defini-

tion of dogmatics would meet with scarcely -more approval by
Barth.
• •• It is the science which presents to our
notice the material obtained by exegesis and
history in an organized and systematic form,
representing the sum of the truth of the
Christian faith in organic connection ~!th the
facts of religious consciousness • • • '
There is in this definition an attempt tog ather meaning
from history which Barth would state as having no meaning.
Barth's definition of dogmatics is as follows:
As a theological discipline, dogmatics
is the scientific test to which the Christian Church puts herself regarding the language about God which is peculiar to her.~2
It is evident that in one respect at least, Barth has returned to a more healthy emphasis.

This is the stress which

he must place upon the importance of doctrine as he also has
stressed exegesis.

As a science, Barth stated that dogmat-

ics must lay an accountable path to its conclusions, but on
the other hand it must not submit to the tests 1.vhich are
valid for the other sciences.

It is the other world science

and cannot undergo empirical proofs of laboratory tests as
do the oth er sciences.

41. H. Orton Wileyi Christian Theology (Kansas City,
Beacon Hill Press, 9~9) I, 29.
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Though Bartn expressly stated that dogmatics has for
its presupposition the ascertainability of truth by the human mind, t his in no way guarantees the fact that truth has
actually been found.

The Church knows the truth only as an

act of faith, in the revelation of God which He has and does
commit to her, but the very nature· of this revelation is
such that it cannot be held nor can it be transmitted without the laying • on of unholy hands.
As an inquiry dogmatics presupposes that
the proper content of Christian language about
God must be known humanly. Christian language
must be investigated as to its conformity to
Christ. In this conformity it is by no means
presented to us obviously or free from difficulties. The finally and adequately given divine answer is the co~terpart of the human
question which retains its faithfulness ·: ·.·
throughout unwearied, honest advance, of the
cry that is sincere even amid the loftiest
attainments, 'not as though I had already
attainedl' True, dogmatics receives the
measure 1.vi th which it measures in an act of
human appropriation. Therefore it must be an
inquiry. It knows the light that is perfect
in itself, that discovers all in a flash.
But it knows it only in the prism of this act,
which, however 2 radically or existentially it
may be regarded, is a human act, offering in
itself no sort of surety for the correctness
of the appropriation in question, being rather fallible and therefore itself in need of
criticism and revision, of repeated and ever
closer re-testing. The creaturely form which
God's revealing action comes to take in dogmatics is therefore not that of kno,vledge
attained in a flash, which it would have to
be to correspond to the divine gift, but a
laborious advance from one partial human insight to another, intending but by no means
guaranteeing an 'advance!'~3
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Barth has continually emphasized that the theologian as \oJell
as the proclaimer must have experienced the truth which is
known only by faith.

But in this world which cannot, at

present at least, know the truth in its entirety, and cannot even be certain of any of its truths about God, theology
is on very uncertain gz:uunQ.s. Having knovm this truth obtained
in the flash, it is by no means certain that this same truth
is still present when human effort attempts to use it in
ascertaining the truth of Christian proclamation.
The necessity of dogmatics is found in the nature of
the church, because she is a sinful creature of this 1vorld.
It is found in the very nature of proclamation itself, because it is the human publishing of the Divine \'lord.

The

need for dogmatics is found in the very nature of dogmatics
itself, as a human effort to establish truth, a truth which
is established not in stability, but in an environment in
which all is relative •
• • • It cannot--at this early stage we may say
so--have in view a system of Christian truth.
All else apart, that would mean that it had
the power to criticise all the Church proclamation ever made, and to put the whole of a
corrected Church proclamation finally befo~~
the public. That i~ simply cannot do • • •
H.

THE WORD OF GOD

The heart of Barth's message is the Word of God.

·44.
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the discussion of the church, of proclamation, and of dogmatics or theology this has been evident.

It is the Word

of God which calls the church into exstence , for without
the revelatory efforts of God to man, there would and could
be no Church.

It is the Word of God which forms the basis

of proclamation, for without this basis, proclamation becomes simply human utterance.

It is the Word of God which

arouses the theologian to a closer scrutiny of the Church's
proclamation in its effort to arrive at the true meaning of
its message.
The question which continually haunts everyone who has
ever studied Barth is just what is the Word of God?

Accord-

ing to Barth, it is God's Divine operation upon man.

It is

God's speaking to man.

Because it is God speaking, not man

speaking to himself nor any other part of the cosmos, it is
different from all other events.

It is the penetration of

the Divine Will into this finite world.

It happens not be-

cause of man's upsurge of feeling, nor because man feels
the necessity for ru1new set of dogmas, values, or directions,
but because God Wills it to happen.
Due to the foreign nature of the Word of God, the imposition of the Absol ute upon the Relative, the Word of God
can only hold for the moment.

This has not been caused by

God's limitation, but because we ourselves are the limited
ones, unable to grasp that which is Eternal.

So when the

Absolute speaks, finite men hear, they know His voice, but

30
it is only for the moment •
• • • God and His Word are not presented to us
in the 1.vay in \vhich natural and historical entities are presented to us. We can never by
retrospect, and so by anticipation, fix what
God is or what His vlord is. He must always
repeat that to us and always repeat it afresh.
But there is no human avrareness corresponding
to this divine utterance. In God's utterance
there come to be a meeting and a communion between His nature and man, but not an absorption
of this nature into man's awareness. There
can only be a const~pt repitition of fresh divine utterance • • • '
In the final analysis to the question of how one can know
who is speaking, the ansvrer which Barth has given is obvious.
One can only know because God lets us know it is He.
God's Word because He says so.

It is

It is God's mystery.

The \vord of God, as man knows it, has always been in
three forms, the \vri tten Word, Proclamation, and in the
Sacraments.

Yet the Word of God is not written, is not

Proclamation nor the Sacraments.

The Word of God, though

from a different atmosphere than the \vorld, al'I}Jays occurs
in conjunction '.ri th a worldly act.

But it is not that act.

This dualistic dogma can be found throughout Barth -- in
Christ; in the Church, and in the Word of God.

But Procla-

t.

mation is the Word of God as God speaks through it; the
Scriptures are the tvord of God as God speaks through them;
and the Sacraments are the Word of God as God uses them to
speak to us.

45.
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The language of God is and remains God's
mystery above all in its worldliness (in the
sense of belonging to the world: and so here
passim). When God speaks to man, this happening is never so marked off from the rest of
what happens that it might not promptly be
also interpreted as a part of this other happening. The Church in fact is also a sociological entity with definite historical and
structural features. Preaching in fact is
also an address. S.acrament in fact is also
a symbol in compromising proximity to all
other possible symbols. The Bible in fact
is also the document for the history of the
religion of a tribe in Nearer Asia and of
its Hellenistic offshoot. Jesus Christ in
fact is also the Rabbi of Nazareth historically so difficult to get information about,
and when it is got, one whose activity is so
easily a little commonplace alongside more
than one other founder of a religion and even
alongside many later representatives of His own
•religion.• And let us not forget that theology in fact, so surely avails itself of
human speech, is also a philosophy or a conglomerate of all sorts of philosophy. Even
the Biblical miracles do not burst these
walls of worldliness. From the moment they
took place they were interpreted otherwise
than as proofs of the Word of God, and admittedly they may ever and anon be interpreted
in a very different sense. The veil is thick.
We do not possess the Word of God other~~se
than in the mystery of its worldliness.
When one has examined the Bible, as Barth would see it, he
then would see a purely fallible human book.

From God's

viewpoint, that which is contained there is a human attempt
to reproduce the Divine Counsel and Wisdom as uttered to
man.

From man's viewpoint, the Bible is but a fruitless

history of a wandering tribe •
• • • Literally we are, therefore, concerned
with human attempts to repeat and reproduce
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in human thoughts and expressions, this Word
of God in definite human situations, e.g. in
respect of the complications of Israel's political position midway between Egypt and
Babylon, or of the error:sand confusions in
the Ch~7stian Church at Corinth between A.D.
50-60.
Though only a human book, the Bible is of the utmost importance.

This is because, it can become the Word of God.

God

is absolute sovereign as Barth has seen Him, . and c annot be
bound by any ties.

As He chooses, He can and does make the

Bible the \-lord of God.

Thus, Barth has explained, God is

not bound by His Word, but His v/ord is bound to Him.

He

chooses as He wills , and make s vital as He sees fit.

No

human fears, no human desires, can ever make or remove the
Word of God •
• • • It takes place as an event, when and where
the word of the Bible becomes God's Word, i.e.
when and where the word of the Bible functions
as the word of a witness, when and where John's
finger points not in vain but really pointedly,
when and \vhere by means of its word vle also
succeed in seeing and h earing what he saw and
heard, Therefore, where the Word of God is an
event, revelation and the Bibl~ are one in fact,
and word for word one at that. 8
Of equal impor:tance, and side by side with its ability to become the Word of God , stands the fact that the Bible is the
symbol of the Word of God.

It proclaims the living message

to the Church - - God has spoken.

As the record of God's

speaking in the past, it holds out the future hope that God
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will again speak.

Buoyed by this hope, the Church can be

confident that she will always have a mission and a message
in this world, and that God will not leave her comfortless,
but will return again unto her.49 ~
Thirdly, the unity of the Bible assures us of the unity
of the Church and of proclamation.5°

This has been one of

Barth's most difficult concepts to comprehend.

The unity

of the Bible does not guarantee that there will not be contradictions, nor does it guarantee that the Church will become united in one faith, for the Bible itself is ful l of
contradictions.

The unity here spoken of, can only be the

unity of the principle behind the Word of God.

That is, it

will always be God speaking. ·- -:that the Church \vill ab.,rays
be the recipient, and that the method of givenness and the
method of reception will

ab>~ays

be united with those of old.

In guaranteeing the unity of proclamation, he could not mean
that the church will ever bear a united message to the world,
but only that it will come from God, hence united.

In the

light of man's inadequacy, it could only be a unity of God's
understanding, not of man's.
God has never spoken to man but in the veiledness of
the flesh.

His Word is cloaked by Proclamation, or by the

word of the Bible.

His supreme revalatory act , Christ, was

veiled in the man, Jesus.
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the message so that it can be misunderstood or even missed
by man.

Barth has stated that t his cosmos is in contradic-

tion to God, and that any revelatory act through it must be
made in spite of it, and not because of it.51 Why then,
does God reveal Himself in the flesh, or only in the veiledness of the cosmos?
• • • The facts are that God Himself veils
himself and in the very process -- which is
why we should not dream of intruding into
the mystery-- unveils Himself. It is good
for us that God acts exactly as He does,
and it could be only fatal for us if He
acted otherwise, if He were manifest to us
in the way we should hold correct, directly
and without veil, without worldliness or
only in that harmless transparent form of
it analogia entis. It would not be greater
love and mercy, it \vould be the end of us
and the end of all things if the lvord v.rere
addressed to us thus.?2
Reason again breaks down if one attempts to understand this
mystery of God.

One accepts it because he believes that God

has ordained it, that in this way all is best for us.
But in our rational breakdown, one is even more helpless than the me r e impossibility to understand God's reason
for veiledness.

Man cannot achieve the unveiling of the

Word from its worldly content, so that to grasp God's Word,
does not mean ·.that men must be able to differentiate one
from the other.

If man attempts to grasp the Word of God

by reason, he would see it first in its worldly form, as an
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event, which would be to think materially.

Then man would

conceive of the Word as spiritual, as full of Divine content.
This would be thinking Idealistically.

To be able to reason

a synthesis would mean to attain the very miracle of God
Himself in the mystery of His Veiledness in His Unveiling •
• • • In faith and in the thought of faith it
is not a case of thinking this synthesis.
Faith means rather recognising that this synthesis cannot be achieved, committing it to
God and seeking to find it in God. By finding it in God we acknowledge that we cannot
do it in ourselves and so can neither achieve
it in a definite attitude in life nor think
it systematically. But by committing it to
God and seeking it in Him, we do find· it, we
hear the '\¥hole, the real word of God, i.e.
now the divine content in its worldly form,
now in the worldly form the divine content • • • 53
In spite of our inability to comprehend its mysteries,
the Word of God speaks to us a new message, something which
man could not have knownotherwise.

Its message meets us

where we are, in the midst of the human situation and speaks
the answer to our perplexity.
any other

experien~e

It comes home to us more than

of life , even more than death itself.

It renews again the relationship which man has lost, because
God's Word is personal.

It is everywhere bound to the per-

son of Christ, and as the Living Word , Incarnate, He is the
message to us.

In our desparate sinful state, this is in-

deed welcome news.

Our human effort has led us to despair,

but God's Word gives us strength to carry onward.
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Man can never hope to escape the bondage of sin.

This

thought of faith, if we might call it a thought of faith,
is a justified and sanctified thought, but this does not
mean that in any way man is less defective, or even the
thought is less defective •
• • • As such, and therefore without becoming
different of and in itself, it is as the
thought of faith, a justified and sanctified
thought. But justification and sanctification by fa~th, means justification and sanc tification by the object of faith, from God ' s
side, without therefore the man of faith or
his thought ceasing to be less defective.
And because we cannot give ourselves faith,
we cannot, therefore, by our thinking create
for ourselves this justification and sanctification, cannot achieve Christianity in our
thought or even merely establish its presence
in ourselves or in others, can only believe in
it as God's grace: believe, because of the
fact that our thought from either side is
faced with a wall which we can neither throw
down nor make transparent , i.e. because of the
unchristianity which cannot disown in our
thought considered in and of itself. Thus
believing now means hearing the divine content of the Word of God, although absolutely
nothin~ but the worldly form is discernable
by us. 4
In summary, it will be observed that Barth's system
presents a complete breakdown of the human reason.
not adequately give

to

bme

It can-

a complete philosophy for in the

midst of life one soon becomes aware of antithesis which cannot be solved.

The resolution of the antithesis are known

only to God Himself ·which must be accepted by faith.

In

this light, the relationship of faith and reason is purely
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negative.

Though God has given to man fleeting glimpses of

light which reveal in a moment the solution to his dilemma,
the glimpses themselves do not present a rational solution,
but one which must be taken by faith alone.

By faith alone,

through the instrumentality of the Word of God , has man been
able to see beyond the antinomies of existence into the world
of God.

The attestati on of t h i s fact ha s been given to man

by that which is recorded in the Bible.

CHAPTER III
THE PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPT OF EMIL: BRUNNER
A.

BIOGRAPHY

Little information is available concerning the life of
Emil Brunner,

He was born in 1889 in Winterthur, Switzer-

land and grew to become one of the leading theologians of
the Swiss Evangelical Church.

Since 1924, with the exception

of a brief interlude as guest professor at the Princeton
Theological Seminary in 1938, he has been professor of Systematic Theology in Zurich, Switzerland. 1 At the present
time, Doctor Brunner is under appointment to the new Japan
International Christian University, located near Tokyo. 2
As young men·, Barth and Brunner, together with Eduard
Thurneysen, constituted a group of young pastors in adjacent
parishes in Switzerland.

In the years directly after the

war, these three in their study and discussions together made
the discovery of the real meaning of the Word of God.3

This

moment became kno'Yn as that time when the Dialectical The-

1. W(alter) A(lexander) \.V(hitehouse), "Emil Brunner, 11
Chamber's Encyclopedia (New York, Oxford University
Press, 1950), B, 141.
2. "Dr. Brunner to Join Japan Christian University
Faculty,'' The Telescope-Messenger, November 1, 1952,
p.

4.

3. Emil Brunner ~and Man,trans. with an intra.
by David Cairns ~London, Student Christian Movement
Press , 193 6) , p. 3 5.
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ology was given birth.

Together, these three men labored to

spread their new found philosophy.
tremenduous opposition.

Needless to say, it faced

Later, the three old friends of

earlier days began to find divergences in their theologies
and have chosen to go their separate ways.
B.

BARTH AND BRUNNER

Before undertaking a thor.ough discussion of Emil Brunner•s philosophy, a comparison of his approach with that of
Karl Barth should be made.
that of the · minister.4-

Barth's viewpoint is primarily

As a liberal minister, he pondered

the problem of the authority of the pulpit.

He realized

that as he spoke, his words of advice, comfort and exhortation were eagerly grasped by the members of his congregation.
These were people who were hard pressed by their everyday
problems.
fused.

Life and its meaning left them baffled and con-

But who was he, that he should offer them these words

from the pulpit?

Was not his word only that of a man'?

\vas

he not a man just as they, 't>Tho was just as perplexed by the
problems of the world?

Why then did he presume to stand

behind the sacred desk to issue advice and comfort when he
too \.vas in need?

Barth came forth to meet this problem of

every liberal minister with the positive affirmation that
he spoke The Word of God.5

4.

Aubrey,

5.

Cf. Ante., p. 29.

QQ.• .

cit., p. 89.
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Brunner's dilemma is not so much concerned with the
problem of the minister, as that of the apologist.

It is

not the message which the church must carry to its own constituents, but the message which she must carry against
those who attack her.
The approach of Barth to theology is from
the problem of what to preach. BrQnner is a theological professor and sees the problem through
the eyes of an i~tellectual facing the scientific, humanistic temper of the moderns, and throwing dm.-m the gauge to them. This is an important
difference; because Brunner is forced to set his
theology in relation not merely to the hu~an
needs of a parish but also tb th~ ? intellectual
needs of those seeking a reorientation of modern
culture. 6
One cannot conclude, however, that Brunner is not concerned
with the ministry of the Church, nor Barth
sophical problems of the Church.

,,.Ji th

the philo-

The emphasis has merely

been placed on a particular aspect of a total situation
which both have recognized.

There was merely a divergence

of approach to the critical question of certainty.

This

does not, of course, preclude the possibility of their arriving at the same conclusions.
Another comparison which might be made between the two
writers is that of style.

Though not necessary for the for-

mal interpretation of their writings, it does give keys into the type of character behind the writings.

The diver-

gence of style is great enough that it can readily be seen

6.

Aubrey, QQ. cit., p. 89.
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although one is limited to reading the manuscripts only in
translation.

Of the two, Barth has given the impression of

the profounder thinker, Brunner that of the best writer.
Brunner's style might be characterized as lucid.

Barth

himself has spoken of Brunner's "uncanny clarity. 11 7 Brunner's attack is relatively methodical.

No new step is un-

dertaken until thorough discussion has been concluded upon
the previous step which formed the fb.undational thought.
Barth, on the other hand, gave the impression of grappling
with ideas and problems too profound to be exactly expressed
in words.

Again and again, he has returned to the same sub-

ject in an endeavor to better express the idea which he intended.

This is not only evident in the method of \-triting,

but in the constant revision to

"~:lhich

he subjects his 1t1orks.

The emphasis upon the relativistic environment in 1..rhich
the individual isfound was not so great in Brunner as in
Barth.

However, Brunner has not ignored the relativistic

attitude of modern scholars but has welcomedit as a sign of
the thinkers' admission of the inability of the human reason to govern all truth.
• • .The profound upheavals of the last few
years, the perception of the nature of a radically nihilistic intellectual outlook, have
today made many people more inclined to listen
to a clear witness to a revelation which is
willing to recognize the legitimate claims of
reason and culure. The relative attitude toward the whole question of truth is not always

7.
·8.

Brunner, God and Man, p. 36.
Cf. Ante., p. 18.

8
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merely the desire to doubt, but very often,
and particularly today it is the admission
of the insufficiency of human knowledge, and-in so far as this is the case--it is the sign
of a secret longing for a truth which lies beyond the human plane • • • 9
C.

PRIMAL SIN

Brunner has visualized that all men are under the yoke
of sin.

The primal sin, as it afflicts all men, is the il-

lusion which man has concerning his own autonomy.

This au-

tonomy, it should be noted, never has been a fact, but merely
an illusion.

This illusion has manifested itself in the sub-

jection of all types of data to the human reason.

It is the

desire of every individual to govern the validity of every
concept by his own reason.
reach an objective decision.

He alone has the only right to
This, Brunner has declared,

is the essence of sin •
• • • But the claim of Christian revelation
goes further than this: through the revelation reason is placed in the wrong, namely,
in all her attempts to comprehend and grasp
the Divine which necessarily spring from reason • • • But it is precisely this limitation
which reason, or rather the rational man,
does not like. Reason wishes to remain the
supreme court of appeal. Reason does not
wish to acknowledge the judgment passed on
it by a unique fact. The will and the pride
of reason rebel against faith • • • Hence the
real stumbling-block is not the theoretical
paradox but the moral humiliation.lO
It is, then, a fundamental axiom that God has granted

9.

Emil Brunner, Revelation and Reason, trans. by
Olive Wyon (Philadelphia, The Westminster Press,

1946), p. 7.

10. Emil Brunner, The Mediator, trans. by Olive Wyon
(Philadelphia, The Westminster Press, 1927), p. 43.
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to man knowledge of certain things.

This was in spite of

the fact that man's faculties have been darkened by sin.
By the very nature of things, that is the nature of the
world and the nature of the reason, man can know certainty •
• • • The works of God in the Creation are
placed before the eyes of all, and reason is
the endowment common to all men, and that which
places them on a higher plane than that occupied by all the other creatures. The objective process of revelation, or the objective means of revelation, and the subjective capacity to receiye revelation are
made for each other • • • ~
But it is the limitation of the human reason which man
has refused to see.
deifying of man.

This is, in actuality, merely the self-

This act, however, has not been committed

by men in the name of reason any more than it has been
committed by men in the name of religion and faith.

In

fact, one gets the impression that Brunner has looked more
hopefully to those who do not thus err in the name of faith.
An examination of the critical points on which Brunner be-

lieved the Church had erred should help to throw additional
light on that problem.
The Church, in her interpretation of the meaning of
"faith," has lost that which is vital for the maintenance
of her existence.

The reason for this mistake can be found

in the Church's response to heresy.

Because of false doc-

trines, the church found it necessary to define who was and
who was not an unbeliever.

11.

Upon everyone who was formally

Brunner , Revelation and Reason, p. 68.

taken into the Orthodox Church, a set of carefully prepared
dogma was imposed.

To this he must acquiesce or be stigma-

tized as a heretic.

Gradually the true object of faith was

dropped and dogma substituted.
A "believer" is no longer , as in the Ne1<1
Testament a person who has been claimed and
transformed by Jesus Christ, but a person who
accepts what the Church offers him as divinely revealed doctrine, since he is aware that
either the Bible or the doctrinal authority
of the Church constitutes an authority to lvhich
he must submit without question.l2
The Church has also grieviously erred in her doctrine
of the Bible.

This error occurred in the Protestant churches

in their desire for surety against the Roman Catholic charges
of heresy.

The Bible became an outward sign and symbol to

which they could refer in defense of Protestant doctrine.
Gradually the Bible became merely a. set of doctrines rather
than a real guide to vital faith.

Faith was then trans-

ferred to it, rather than the true object for which faith
was intended •
• • • The habit of regarding the written word,
the Bible, as the 11V/ord of God 11 exclusively-as is the case in the traditional equation of
the "word" of the Bible 'ltli th the 11 Word of God 11 - an error which is constantly on the verge of
being repeated--is actually a breach of the
Second Commandment: it is the deification of
a creature, bibliolatry.l3
Another mistake of the Church, which has a very close

12.

Ibid., p. 9.

13.

Ibid., p. 120.
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connection with the preceeding two, has been her misuse of
doctrine.

With her doctrines , the Church has attempted to

construct an entire world view.

That is , the church has

subjected herself to the illusion that all reality, including God Himself can be known in a rationally ordered set
of doctrines.

This has come about through the unholy wed-

lock of Christian thought to Greek philosophy.

Thus God

can be proved to be from the order of nature around him.
To Brunner, this is a supreme delusion.
The self-confidence of the reason is nowhere more evident than in tUe attempt to
prove the existence of God.
D.

FAITH AND REASON

The heart of Brunner's criticism can be found in his
meaning of the word,

11

faith.n

His criticism of the Church

was basically the fact that "faith" has no longer the meaning of "faith," and has been changed to reason.

Instead of

faith in God, Christianity now asserted it has faith in
reason because by that method she can know God.

Instead of

faith in God, dogma has been substituted, particularly as
found in the doctrinization of the Bible.

Thus the church

had faith in a book, not in God.
To make the distinction clear between faith and knowledge, Brunner has set forth the ways in which faith differs
from reason.

14.

But though faith differs from reason, it was

Ibid., p. 338.
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only through faith that reason could preserve and maintain
its true validity.
Revealed knowledge is poles apart from
rational knowledge • • • Jesus Christ is not
the enemy of reason, but only of the irrational arrogance of those who pride themselves on their intellect, and of the irrational self-sufficience of reason • • • In
spite of this, however, it remains our duty
to inquire into the positive relation between the two, precisely because ~e must make
this contradiction intelligibl~. 1
The process of reason, as it is related to this world,
has given to man during the process of history, a gradual
command over his objects of knowledge.

Thus man has gradu-

ally been able to make this world an easier place to live
through the progress of science.

Revealed knowledge, how-

ever, is in direct contrast to this type of knowledge,
• • • Natural acquisition of secular knowledge
makes us masters of that which we know • • •
God through His revelation, becomes Lord over
me; He makes me His property; by this very
fact I become free, an~ 6 indeed only then do
I develop my true "I".
Reason has enabled man to accumulate a vast amount of
data concerning the world around him.

Many men of today

are acquainted with almost every aspect of life as it is
known in this world.

But revealed knowledge, which comes

by faith, is not of this nature.
• • .The knowledge of revelation does not add
to my knowledge; it .does not make me "educated";

15.

Ibid., p. 11.

16.

Ibid., p. 26.
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it does not enlarge my "sphere," but it
transforms !!lli myselfl it changes the one
who receives it • • • 7
The knowledge of faith is in antithesis with the ordinary knovrledge of reason for still another reason.
tional knowledge is gained in a solitary process.

Ra-

When man

has finally mastered a particular subject of study, this
mastery is his alone.

There is no sharing of the actual

learning process because he cannot learn for someone else.
True, he could share his new found learning, but the one
with whom he shared must likewise learn for himself or it
would not be his own.

Brunner has stated that revealed

knm.,rledge is a process that is exactly opposite to this one •
• • • In revelation, however, the exact opposite
takes place: since God makes Himself kno~to
me 1 I am no longer solitaryi the knowledge of
God creates community, and 1ndeed community
is precisely the aim of the divine revelation. 1 8
E.

ORIGINAL REVELATION

The presupposition to revelation, is sin.

If there

were no sin, there \'v'Ould be no necessity for revelation.
Though sin is and can be a state, that is, the state of being far distant from God, primarily sin is the ac t of rejection of God.

This act of wilful disobedience is not

static, in other words, but it is dynamic •
• • • Sin, fundamentally, is the revolt of the
creature against the Creator, the attempt of

17.

Ibid.

18.

~bid.,

p. 26.
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the creature to escape from dependence on
God, in order not to be under God, and related to God, but to be without God, that
is , not only to be conditionally, but unconditionally free • • • 19
The presupposition to sin, is original knowledge of God.
If man is to turn away from God , must he not know from whom
he turns?

This knowledge of sin, of lost possession domi-

nates man's life.

He may and pr obably will do his best to

ignore his lost condition, but ever again is he reminded of
his desperation •
• • • Sin, however, is a conception connoting
personal action, active p_e rsonality. Sin
means that I am in wrong relation to God and
that I have torn myself away from an original divinely given possibility. Sin means,
then, neither a "not-yet" as evolutionism
says, nor a "not-n0\1 11 as the moralists say:
it is a "no-longer." It is an alienation,
a disrupted relation, a having left the Father • • • Guilt, as a necessary aspect of evil, presupposes that the original fellowship with God is broken. Something has happened over which we have no longer any control; and the damage is beyond our ability
to repair. Only when sin is defined as guilt
is evil comprehended in its personal form.
It is not something that is wrong between God
and myself. Evil is not ~something between
God and man; it is myself in the 1.vrong position. When this position is taken I cannot
change it. Guilt means the loss of ability
to return to my original place. Evil is taken really seriously only when it is understood
as guilt. 2 0
Hovrever, if one supposes that this break with the

19.

Ibid., p. 50.

20. Emil Brunner, The Theology of Crisis (Ne'l.v :. York,
Charles :Scribneli's Sons, 1929), p. 51+:-
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Father can be conceived of as an historical event, an occurrence which can be dated and knm.·m by the sinner, he is
mistaken.

Without revelation, and its knowledge, man can

be almost blissfully unaware of any sense of guilt.

But

when God has spoken, when one has been confronted by that
which has been revealed, then he suddenly becomes aware of
the intense span which has separated him from

God~

• • • Hence the converse is also true; the more
personal is our relation to God, the more plainly do sin and guilt stand out. The obstacle
which blocks the v1ay, the great bomliler on the
path, m.ves its weight to the divine nearness,
through which guilt is maintained, so that it
cannot be dispelled by any specious arguments:
thus our sense of guilt is due to the presence
of the Divine Holiness. 2
According to Brunner, man has been separated fro m all
other creatures by the fact of responsibility.

The core of

human personality is not rationality but responsibility.

To

a limited extent, psychologists have demonstrated that animals do have intelligence, but none but man feels guilt.

To

think of God, is for man to feel his own sinfulness and guilt.
He is ever impressed, if he chooses to think ·seriously, of
the impassible span which has separated him from God.

But

every rational act of man reflects his responsibility, his
relationship to God.

Man cannot think of number without

also the thought of infinite number.

He cannot state the

truth without thinking in turn of absolute truth.

21.

Brurmer, The Mediator, p. 320.
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not mean that simply because of the awareness of reason to
God, that man can really know God through reason.

Reason

simply has made man constantly aware of his own responsibility •
• • • The reason is not God; but vlhat it is and
does can be understood only in the light of the
original revelation. Man's reason therefore is
also the cause of his eternal unrest, due to
the fact that it is derived from God and has
been made for God. It is precisely the activity of the reason which is the unmistakable sign
that man comes from God, and from a divine revelation, even when the activity of the reason
takes the form of denying God.22
In the above quotation, Brunner has man involved in one
of his many paradoxes.

Though man has attempted to ma ke rea-

son supreme, it is precisely this rational activity which
constantly has reminded him of his guilt.

Reason, in its

very attempt to make itself supreme, does in that very
indicate tha t it is derived, hence not God.

act~

This is called

by Brunner, original revelation.
Original revelation is closely connected with Brunner's
concept of revelation in creation.

Revelation has ah1ays

been apparent to men in the works of God.

It was most rea-

sonable for him to assume God from creation, but it did not
lead to a knowledge of God.

This has not been the fault of

the revelation, but the fault lay in man.

Hence, through

general revelation, man's responsibility has been pressed
upon him.

Having known of God, man refused to use his know-

ledge aright until God has spoken personally to him through
I

22.

Brunner, Revelation and Reason, p.
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special revelation.
Thus we see clearly that while the Bible
teaches a general revelation, or a revelation
in the Creation it does not teach "natural
theology. 11 • • • Rather, it is an integral part
of the sin of man that the kno\vledg e of God
which begins to dawn upon him through revelation is suppressed by him, so that the revelation which God gives him for knowledge of
Himself become5 the source of the vanity of
idolatry • • • 2
There has ever been only one true theology.

But true the-

ology can only arise in an environment conducive to its
growth.

This is a Christian environment.

That atmosphere

of which knm.dedge must partake, Brunner has stated is the
attitude of belief •
• • • Dogmatic thinking is not only thiruring
about the faith, it is believing thinking.
There may be various \·Ja;,rs of solving the
problem of the theory of knowledge which
this raises: this, in any case, is the claim
which dogmatics makes \vithout which its effort ceases to be dogmatics, and it ~~comes
the neutral science of religion. • •
As one examines these statements, it becomes evident
that although right thinking is possible, right thinking is
not probable.

The man untouched by the Word of God, naturally

suppressed the message of general revelation, while dogmatics
was only possible in the attitude of "believing thinking."
This perversion of reason has been caused by the fall of man.
This faculty has remained, to deny the fact would be absurd,
for through this alone, could man be made a truly responsible
23.
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creature.

What man has lost, is the moral direction which

reason originally had, that is, the right use of the reason.
The Old Testament understanding of the Image of God 1.,rhich
considered the reason in itself did not consider the i mage
as lost, for that is what makes man, man.
ment, considering the moral

natt~e

The New Testa-

of the Image, has con-

cluded that the Image has been lost •
• • • All that is left of the divinely created
nature of man is the rational nature, but not
the right attitude of the reason, in conformity with the will of God. Thus, in point of
fact, the imago, understood in the Old Testament sense, is merely ~ "Relic" of the original, total imago • • • 2
One might 'i.vell ask, what is the content of general
revelation.

Brunner has answered this by stating that man

does have a concept of law.

Human existence without law,

without an idea of r ·ight and '\•Trong coupled together with a
moral idea \vould be impossible.

That the idea of right and

wrong often differs in cultures throughout the world is not
important.

What is important is the fact of lavl.
Therefore, the moment that human consciousness exists the problem of ethics is
raised, the question of right conduct must
be faced. Further, it is also impossible
to avoid setting up a principle of order,
a definite scale of values to express preference, \olhatever theoretical position may
be afterwards adopted towards this principle. For we can.not make the smallest decision save in the light of a superior purpose

25.
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a norm, a commandment; indeed, we cannot avoid
having one supreme idea of purpose and order-although this may be still very indistinct,
and we may be only dimly a\vare of it • • • 2o
Natural man, however, not only has this "Thou Shalt" of
Kantian ethics, but also, the "Therefore I Can."

Again the

illusion of autonomous man has reared its ugly head.

The

distorted natural ethic has failed to really note the heart
of the divine message of general revelation, that man is
sinner.

Not only did natural reason fail to notice the

real message, in the very act of misconstruing the message,
he committed even grosser sin.
thinks he is good.
vrha t

Basically, the natural man

He ever realizes that he does not do

he is commanded, but if ever he would really put him-

self to the task, that is really ever become morally in earnest, then he could keep the law.

This is a complete perver-

sion of the message that man is sinner.
Further, it is t his very moral effort in
itself, or rather the assumption vrhich is
bound up with it, that the Good can be attained
along this path, which is evil. For this is
the evidence of self-confidence, self-security,
self-reference, belief in the power to redress
the situation for and by oneself. Therefore
evil does not come out most clearly, in its
most obvious form, where natural morality looks
for it, namely, in vice, in moral reprobation
1>1hich everyone can recognize as such, but it
appears in the self-righteousness of the legalist2 \vhether the latter be a Pharisee, vrho regards himself as justified in the sight of God,
or a Stoic, who suns himself in his own Divine

26. Emil Brunner The Divine Imperative, trans. by
Olive Wyon (PhilaJelphia, The Westminster Press,
1947), p. 18.
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goodness, or the mystical saint, vrho thinks
that he ha s traversed all the stages of sanctification to the end. These a ll walk in the
\vay of the just, thinking that this path \vill
lead them to the goal. They are all living under the illusion that the Good is that which
they are able to realize~ None of them know
that God alone is good.2t
F.

THE NATURE OF GOD

From the necessity of revelation considered from the
viewpoint of man, the thought of revelation can be considered
from the viewpoint of God.

The necessity of revelation can

be found in the very nature of God.

Again, this will cast

new light on the nature of revelation for revelation to be
revelation must have two poles.

If revelation \vere not ade-

qua tely adapted to man, then it 1>1ould not be revelation at
all.

If it were not adequately adapted to the nature of God,

it would not be revelation at all.

For revelation must both

reveal and be received to be true revelation.

Without re-

ception nothing is revealed, without content, nothing could
be revealed.
God, by His very nature, is not the God of the concept
of philosophical thought.

A-- nan-thought God is not that God

which has revealed himself to men in history.
Whatever the content of the philosophical
ideas of God may be in detail one trait of character is common to all: it is a man-thought God,
a God \vho is found by way of thinking, or negatively it is not a God who reveals himself in

27.
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history • • • Even if we knew nothing else of
the philosophical idea of God than this one
thing, that it is reached or acquired by
philosophical thinking, we would know by
that the most essential thing, namely th~~
this God is not a God of revelation • • • This has brought us once again to the traditional proofs
given for God.

It has already been demonstrated that Brun- ·

ner feels that the very· attempt to find a logical necessity
for God is in itself an arrogant attempt of the autonomous
man.

While Faith, which has contact with the God who is ever

revealing Himself, has no interest in the traditional proofs,
nevertheless they do demonstrate that reason leads to'\vard God •
• • • No "proof of the existence of God" leads
to the Lord God; by this I do not mean that
such 'tproofs 11 have no value 1 but that they do
not lead to the knowledge or the Living God.29
The God of logical necessity cannot be a Personal God.

It

is the very nature of personality that it cannot be known
through reason.
itself.

One knows personality only as it reveals

Though this is relatively true concerning human

personality, God is the Absolute Personality making this an
Absolute truth.

As logical necessity, God is robbed of Per-

sonality and the Absolute Freedom

"~:lhich

the God 'l.vho reveals

Himself has demonstrated.
Here a remark on "person 11 may be useful.
What is personality as distinguished from anything else? A person is a being of such a

28. Emil Brunner, The Scandal of Christianity (Philadelphia, The Westminster Press, 1951), p. 33.
29.
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kind that we cannot ourselves think it, but
it reveals itself to us in an act of revelation. What I myself think . is the object of
my thought. Even 1.,rhen I think God as personal being this God is the object of my
thought and therefore not truly personal.
He can be something different from an object of thought only if it is not myself who
think him, but. himself who reveals himself
by an act of self-disclosure. Everything
ivhich I think myself, or the reality which
is disclosed by my own mental activity, is
therefore not a person. A person is that
unique being which discloses itself and therefore enters into my thought-world, so to say,
as a stranger, affirming itself as an I in its
own right. In my own thought-world I am the
unchallenged centre, I am the subject of all
objects of my thought, and by that, so to say
master of them all. When, however, a person
encounters me, a rival world-centre faces met
a kind of being which refuses to be a part or
my thought system. This is the absolutely
unique fact of meeting a Thou. God as personal God is the God who does not allow himself to be placed amongst the objects of my
thought, but claims not only to be a self~ like
myself, but the real centre of all I's and Iworlds. And this is exactly what is meant by
the Lord God revealing himself as Lord. Perhaps this becomes clearer when we come to consider the second fundamental trait of the revealed essence of God, namely divine love and
mercy.30
To return for a moment to general revelation, it can be
clearly seen that the vital reason that man cannot know God
in this maru1er, is because in general revelation, God cannot be known as Person.

Only as God speaks to us, in the

Special Revelation of His Person, can man really kno1.v Him.
Where can one then expect to encounter this Special Revelation of His Person?

30.
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as the greatest single vritness to revelation, and examine
its contents to learn of the nature of revelation.
Brunner has often referred to the Bible as the Word of
God.

It is t his, only by virtue of the fact, and only in

so · far as it bears \vitness to Christ.
the

~vord

To call the Bible

of God does not in anyway imply that it is infal-

libly inspired.
First of all comes the tradition of historical facts 1 as they appear in the Gospels,
in the book or Acts, and, to some extent, also
in the Epistles. This early tradition was
guided and inspired by the Holy Spirit, but
was also a product of human research and selection and, therefore, it is not verbally
inspired. Even this simple tradition of facts
is intended to be a \vi tness of faith, a testimony to Christ; it is the tradition of the
kerygma. No one today \vho keeps his eyes open
to facts fails to be aware that this tradition
has certain errors and inconsistencies. At
the present time only an ignorant or insincere person can produce a complete "Harmony of
the Gospels," or an account vlhi ch reconciles
all contradictions in the reports of the Lucan
and the Pauline explanations and discussions.
The Apostles who, in the "Council;·· of the .Apostles," first strove -vrith one another before
they could come to a common decision, are also
in their accounts of e31nts not free from inconsistency and error.
G.

THE BIBLE

It might be inserted here that the Church also can deliver the \vord of God.

Its relationship, however, must be

the same as that of the Bible to Christ.

31.

Bru~ner,

Exposition of the

Revelation and Reason, p. 128.

58
Bible is not a necessity, but the Word of the Church must be
in harmony with the Person of Christ.
The \ford is preached not only where the
discourse is explicitly expository in character, but it is preached wherever Jesus Christ
is proclaimed in harmony with the witness of
the Bible. God is not a "Book God;" what matters is not the Book, but the Person. The
statement "We have not Christ apart from the
Bible," is true for the Church as a whole; it
is only indirectly true for the individual who
passes on his faith to another or \vho receives
faith from another • • • The decisive elemen.~,the
process of creation may happen without the opening of a Bible ai all, without the quotation
of a text from the Bible. But it cannot take
place apart from· the fact that the one 1.-1ho
gives his testimony lives in the Bible, and in
a Christian community, which is spiritually
nourished by t~2 whole expository tradition
of the Church.
Returning to the thought of the witness found to Christ
in the Bible, one can find this witness in several forms.
The primary witness is that given by the disciples as the
Word of God broke through to them.
a response to this revelation,
of the Living God. 11 33

'~hou

Their first witness was
art the Christ, the Son

This is the vrord of personal encounter.

From this \vord of personal encounter, the word of witness 1.,ras
changed to teaching, the telling about Jesus.

Although this

was a direct result of the first experience, it is only a
secondary witness to Christ.
The Old Testament has found its way into the canon because it also bears witness to Christ.

This does not mean

that it has the same viewpoint as the New Testament.

32.
33.
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fact, it has an altogether different viewpoint, for the Old
Testament looks foward to the coming of Christ, while the
New Testament looks back as the mission accomplished.

Christ

is the unity of all revelation, whether Biblical or that given to the church at a later date.
The unity found throughout the Bible does not mean the
unity of doctrine.

It is not a unity of doctrine, but a

unity of the divine revealing action.

In order to maintain

unity of doctrine, one is continually caused painful embarrassment because of the differences in the historical situation.

The doctrine is not the same because of the limita-

tions of the human recipient of revelation, for one act of
revelation builds upon another, and without the first the
second would not be understood •
• • •When, however men try to read the same
truths into the Old Testament as are in the
New, they are not using Scriptural exegesis,
but allegory. On the other hand, expositors
who fail to see the Old Testament reveals and
bears witness to the same Goq who speaks to
us in the New Testament are not expounding
the Scriptur~~ in harmony with their central
message. • •
The basic reason that the attempt to make the Bible a
unity of doctrine was in error was that it destroyed this
one central purpose of the Bible.

The purpose, according

to Brtutner, is to reveal Christ.

It is the revelation of

His person.

34.
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the focus faith is turned away from God to absolute truths.
The idea of personal encounter which takes place by faith
will be lost.

Doctrine only serves its purpose by examin-

ing the message of the Church to see if it fosters this personal encounter.

But t his doctrine, is in itself, not an

attempt to arrive at final truth through reason •
• • • In order to achieve as correct a doctrine
as possible, we must take pains to express it
ever more truly and clearly, and yet we must
not imagine that we have really said 11 it 11 when
we have dissected and refined our definitions
a hundred times over. Were Christ not the Word
made flesh, the content of the definite doctrinal statements of Apostles or Prophets~ all
this effort would be in vain; but because He
Himself is the \fjord, and therefore can never
be fully expressed in human words, no doctrinal
formation, however excellent, can claim to be
the Word of God itself, or even the infallibly
"correct" doctrine, v.Ihich has been formulated
and laid down once for all.35
Apostolic doctrine about Christ cannot be harmonized.

Often

contradictory, from this viewpoint and that, the Apostles
sought in vain to express the Person of Christ.

But He is

beyond human words and human powers of comprehension.
That which makes it so important that the Bible be
judged in the light of the person of Christ is that He is
the revelation.
encounter.

For this reason revelation must be personal

The words of prophets in the Old Testament bore

authority because they had received them from God. But the
identity of the prophets was of little importance.

35.
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authority was given them in the message of God.

In Christ

the message and the authority have been brought down to one.
He is the message to the world, the supreme revelation, as
no one else could ever be.
Concerning revelation and Biblical criticism, Brunner
is more in difficulty than is Barth.

The message of reve-

lation is a little more closely connected with this \·Torld.
To Barth, Biblical criticism simply does not matter.
this point Brunner charged Barth with Docetism.

At

In so far

as the Bible vli tnessed to us concerning Christ, Brunner believed one must accept it.
that of reason.

It is the message of faith, not

In so far as the Bible witnessed to natural

events, to things of this world, Brurmer did not object to
the scrutiny of higher criticism.

In fact, he welcomed it

for the part it played in the destruction of Bibliolatry •
• • • He binds us to the Scripture, in so far
as it witnesses to Christ, in so far as it
discloses the will of God and His nature,
but not in so far as it teaches us ordinary
facts about the world. The letter of the Bible ·
is not the object of faith, but the means of
the divine self-revelation. • .we are not
told to "believe in the Scriptures," but in
faith in Christ to know and to experi~gce the
word of Scripture as the word of God.j
Whether Brunner has escaped from the

dile~~a

which has so

plagued the so-called Orthodox groups is doubtful.

He must

constantly be defining that which is of Christ and that lvhich

36.
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is of · the world, and is constantly in danger of completely
denying the vlOrld and falling into mysticism.

Already, he

admitted that some criticism has gone too far, that it must
be tempered.

But in the long run, Biblical criticism, he

feels, did Christianity a favor.

By destroying a false faith

in the Bible, men are now able by the aid of the witness of
the Holy Spirit to leap over the barriers of historical
relativism and become contemporary with Christ, in a sense
not even Pontius Pilate could ever become a contemporary.
H.

THE NATURE AND PURPOSE OF TRUE FAITH

Even though faith is a personal encounter vJith Christ,
though revelation comes from a sphere outside the legitimate
bounds of reason, yet the message of revelation is adapted
to man and pas s es through a process of rational understanding by the recipient •
• • • Revelation is always a mystery but it is
never magic. In revelati on the unconditioned
and the conditioned subjects, the Absolute,
the Infinite, and the c~eaturely spirit meet.
Therefore, revelation always passes through
a process of understanding by man. Even if
revelation creates a new understanding, it
does not create this without laying ~laim
upon the natural understanding • • • 3 ·;
True faith is never a neutral act such as the assent
given to -vrhat the Church has set up as infallible dogma.
True faith is the giving of oneself completely into the

37.
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control and power of the Saviour.

This is not done blindly,

but it is done because man has become convinced that this
is what is best for him.

These convincements are in the

sphere of the rational, in the sphere of the comprehension
of the natural understanding, \vhich tell him the need of a
complete surrender.
To use an illustration from ordinary human life, "faith" in the genuine, Biblical,
sense is not the acceptance of the statement
of a reliable authority, but it is the relation of trust in another person; it is personal
relation between two human beings. It is true,
of course that the personal act of trust, obedience, and love is preceded by some elements
of objective knowledge--as also they precede
the act of faith--but they are not the personal act itself • • • When I give myself to God
in the obedience of faith, I become free from
the anxious .-intensity- of '-:self-absdrption, and
I love my neighbor as myself. For when I give
myself to God, I w~gl what He will, I love
with His love • • •
The knowledge which has come by faith does not destroy
reason.

It merely sets it aright.

That which is destroyed,

is the arrogance and the pride which has tended to make the
reason to become its own God •
• • • The Word of God, which in its decisive
content, as the word of the Cross, is folly
and scandal to my natural reason, is th8 divine hammer which knocks on the closed door
of the autonomous self-imprisoned reason.
But it does not destroy reason; rather, it
liberates it, by setting it free from the
curse of sin, namely, from that illusion of
autonomy, the desire to being like God, and
it reverses the Fall, which consisted in
the fact that man wanted to eat of the fruit

· 38.
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of the tree in the center of t h e garden, a s
well as t he fruit of the other trees~ in order that he might be equal with God • .)9 .
This leaves to reason the field of its legitimate concern, the world.

In this field the reason ought to dominate,

for man must progress.

Thus, true faith is not opposed to

Science as long as Science does not go beyond the sphere of
her legitimate area •
• • • on the other hand, there is nothing
wrong in the i n sistence on autonomy in the
sphere of knowledge; indeed, this should be
recognized as the proper goal of kno~o..rledge.
In everything which concerns this world, it
is part of our destiny_and our duty to seek,
as far as possible, to reach our "mvn" knowledge by the use of our reason. • .The autonomy of the knm>~ledge of this world is enveloped in . the theonomy of the knovlledge of God.
We cannot, and ought not, to try to know God
in the same way that we know the world. We
are intended to kno-v1 Him and can knmv Him
only througU His own v'iord, from His ovm selfrevelation. 0
I.

THE DEFENSE OF FAITH

The world continually has called upon the Church to
prove that the truth vlhich She has, has been Divinely revealed.

By this challenge, the world has been able clever-

ly to entangle the Church in a question, the very presupposition of which eliminated the possibility of its being answered.

To prove this truth is, of necessity, to give the

39.
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rational grounds for it.

This is beyond the sphere of rea-

son.
• • •~vere faith to try to deal with the unreasonable demands implied in that question,
by which it is confronted, it would no longer
be faith at all. Revelation, as the Christian faith understands it, is indeed , by its
very nature, something that lies beyond all
rational arguments; the argument which it certainly claims in its support does not lie in
the sphere of rational knowledge, but in the
sphere of that divine truth which can be attained only through divine self-communication,
and not through human research of any kind.
That question or assumption therefore proceeds
from an ~ priori rejection of revelation, from
the denial of the possibility of a knowledge
that transcends rational knowledge. Henar it
is the question of doubt or of unbelief.
The Church, instead of permitting the world to scorn
because She refuses to answer this question, must in her
turn gain the offensive.

She must not only demonstrate to

the world the illegitimacy of this question, but also take
the offensive by revealing the insufficiency of reason to
subjugate all things , even God Himself, to itself.
While the autonomous reason maintains
that it must be possible to incorporate all
that is true into the sphere of the criteria
which it has itself set up--reason that is
transcendent is said to be untrue--faith reverses the lvhole problem, and shows that it
,::· is .: pre~isely this demand that falsifies knmvledge and the concept of truth. It is not
that God and His truth must have room within
the sphere of reason, but reason and its truth
must find its place in God. For it is not man
who i ·s the measure of all things but God.
Within the truth of revelation ail tha t reason
kno-vrs and recognizes falls into place. Faith
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does not come into conflict with reason itself, but with the imperialism of the human
reason; we must, hO\vever, add that this "imperialism11 or this "illusion of autonomy" is
not a matter that affect certain people only,
but it is common to all the sons of men.~2

J.

THE RECEPTION OF REVELATION

Throughout his writings, particularly in his book which
dealt specifically with the problem, Revelation and Reason,
Brunner has attempted to lay aside the stigma of irrationalism by which he has been kno-vm.

His defensive effort has

been turned into an offense by his charge that basica l ly the
ones who oppose him are the ones v!ho are the irrationalists.
Man yields to faith because he has been convinced rationally
that it is in his ovm best interest.
reason, it strengthens it.

Faith does not destroy

It shatters the self-centeredness

of reason and imparts to it the quality of objectivity.
Brunner, however, believes that reason does have a positive relationship to faith.

This relationship is in the

process of cloaking of revelation which God does to permit
man to receive it.

It is the garb of flesh which enables

the spiritual to be seen and understood by the one to whom
the message is intended.
To the Greek, He comes as one who speaks
Greek, to the Chinese as one who speaks Chinese in order that man may be able to understand Him, just as a tall man will bend dovm

42.
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to a little child and take him · on his knee
in order that he may be able to look into
his face. God does not talk over the heads
of His human children, and He do e s not pour
His Spirit into their hearts by force; but
He speaks to them in a way that they can understand. The understanding of the Word--in
so far as it is the grammatical and lo gical
understanding of something that has been said;
also in so far as it is the grammatical and
logical understanding of the preaching of
the Gospel--is an act of mental and rational
self-activity on the part of man. Without
this rational self-activity on the part of
man no faith arises. We do not say that faith
is this rational self-activity of man but
that it is the logical grammatical understanding of that which is said, even if said by an
Apostle or a Prophet; without this mental, rational self-activity the Word of God cannot be
understood; without it no faith arises. R~~
son is the conditio sine ~ua llQll of faith. j
One can still understand this part of the revelation of
God and yet not have faith.

The message of Jesus or the A-

postles can be understood perfectly by all rational men,

a~d

yet there may be a failure of all of them to obtain faith.
On the other hand the same message may be apprehended by the
most rabid believer and still no act of faith occur.

It is

only when the message comes home to man, when it speaks to
him in his sinful condition of his sinful condition, that
man makes the act of faith.
In this judgment on man, \-Thich, it is
true, is not given by faith, but with the aid
of faith, the naked reality of man's need
stands out clearly. Hence this judgment includes all that man already knew about himself--that he is in distress; that he is sinful,
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guilty; tha t he is dissatisfied with his existence. Only now, however, do all t h ese perceptions come wholly to the surface, whereas
formerly they were forcibly suppressed. Now
alone , do they come out into the open, just
as they are without any illusions, no longer
repressed by the censor of the self which loves
itself and is a~~ious about itself , but in the
stern severity of the truth, -vrhich sees things
as they are in the merciless light of the law.
Here all "immanent" self-knowledge c omes into
its ovm, only without all the modifications
connected with the insistence on the autonomy
of the reason. Thus faith does not reject
the rational judgment of man on himself, but
it mer ely impels man to express fully what
previously he had only half admitted. Faith
forces the rea s on to complete honesty. For
it is only in t his honesty, which unveils man's
real situation as a whole, that faith--or,
rather, Christ--can speak His own word, which
was not within man's power at all. Here, then,
something quite new emerges, a paradoxical
self-knowledge, namely, identifie~tion with
Christ: Christ my Righteousness.
It might be concluded then, that fait h in its true nature, bec omes evident in the light of the fall of man.

Faith

does not shatter the reason, it sets it once more aright.

No

longer does reason suppress what it knows to be true , that
man is sinner, but it accepts through the enabling power which
comes by faith the truth of reason's ovm self-centeredness and
insufficiency.

Faith has done its work.

has revealed Himself.

The Divine Person

That flash of recognition h aving gone,

reason once again resumes its arrogant ways until once again
it is struck dovln by the r evelation of the Divine Holiness.

44. Ibid., p. 426.

CHAPTER

IV

THE CONSERVATIVE POSITION OF E.J. CARNELL
A.

BIOGRAPHY

Edward John Carnell is one of the bright lights of American Conservatism.

Relatively only a young man, the fu-

ture gives hope for his becoming one of the great apologists
of this age.

In addition to the publishing of three books

concerning Christian philosophy, Carnell not only has won
the William Brenton Greene Jr. prize in Apologetics at Westminister Theological Seminary, Philadelphia, but also first
prize in Eerdmans Evangelical Book Award Competition in

1948. 1
Carnell received his college training at Whe aton College.

After attending Westminister Theological Seminary,

he also attended Boston University , from which he received
the degree of Ph.D. and Harvard Divinity School from which
he received the Th.D. degree.

He has taught at Gordon Col-

lege of Theology and Missions in Boston and Gordon Divin ity
School , Brookline, Massachusetts.

At present, he is in-

structor at Fuller Theological Seminary, Pasadena, Cali. 2

f

orn~a.

1. From the Book Cover of An Introduction to Christian
Apologetics (Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing
Company, 1948).
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While attending Boston University, Carnell was greatly
influenced by the teachings of Professor E.S. Brightman,
from whom he has borrowed much in his epistemological study.
Under no circumstance, however, can this be taken as an implication that Carnell has necessarily reached the same conelusions as did Dr. Brightman.

This could only be deter-

mined by a thorough study of both men which is beyond the
scope of this paper.
B.

THE SEARCH FOR TRUTH

Carnell has started where man is.

In the gradual en-

folding of day to day occurrence·s, the greatest problem which
faces every individual is the problem of happiness.

It is

evident that by happiness he does not mean it in the hedonistic sense of the term.

This is a happiness which involves

final ends, not the immediate satisfaction of our desires
and wants.

Bound to the earth by his physical being, man

has been subjected to pain, disfigurement, disease, and worst
of all, death.

But freed from this environment, man's soul

can soar above the grimeand the mire of mere physical existence and envision ideal existence.

In this existence, the

problems of his ovm physical existence disappear into what
man believes to be the ideal existence.

What he envisions

and the method by which these ideals are to be gained are
simply known as values.
That which men choose seeking an increase
of happiness is known as a value. Nothing
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mystical about, it , a value issimply anything
which we prize or esteem. Values comprise the
very stuff of satisfaction, the magnetic power
which draws a free man into commitment.j
In this quest for happiness as found and made objective
in the choice of values, man's greatest issue which must be
settled is that of certainty.

The possibility of values

vThich might be chosen are infinite in number, but man's time
here on earth is limited.

At best, one can only scan a few

of the multitude of possibilities.

How then can he hope to

know with certainty that he has the truth?
Carnell, to aid in the search for values, has attempted
to set up what he believes to be a working criteria.

With-

out some sort of criteria man would be· floundering about without direction or goal.

Whether man does so knowingly or not,

he must have purpose, whether it be immediate satisfaction
or long range and ultimate happiness.

In some way, man must

attempt to link his ideal world with the world which he experiences in the cold and hard facts of physical existence.
If the practical problem of man is dispelling the fear of death through a successful union
of the ideal and empirical worlds, the theoretical problem is the location of a rational connection between these realms. Philosophically
this difficulty is known as the problem of the
one within the many. The many are the particulars of the time-space universe while the one
is the logical or teleological connection between

3. Edward John Carnell, A Philosophy of ~ Christian
Religion (Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing
Company, 1952), p. 16.
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them.4
The problem of the one and the many has always been one
of the vital points of philosophy.

Empirically, man has

gathered the facts of reality, rationally he has attempted
to place them into a logical system.

On the one hand, if

man has ignored the reason in his philosophy, it will be
slanted toward the many.

Consequently, everything in reali-

ty \vill be observed in the state of change.

Empiricall y ,

man has always been impressed by the vicissitude of nature.
But, on the other hand, if man withdraws from

.

emp~rical

ob-

servation so far as to place nearly all the emphasis upon
the rational, he forgets the cosmos of movement.
many, he sees the one.
of rational being.

From the

Becoming is forgotten -. i.I'l the light

Only the eternal, changeless realm is

the real.
We are still tempted to make an either/or
affair of what must be a both/and. We cannot
choose between logic and experience. Without
logic our experience cannot be normative; without experience our logic cannot be relevant to
the human situation. This problem, like the ·
poor, is always with us.5
The Christian view of reality, then, must include both points
of view, ignoring neither the rational nor the empirical.

To

form this unity, Carnell has stated his criteria for truth as
systematic consistency.

If a truth is stated and proven

without doubt, then it necessarily implies the falsity of its

4.
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contradiction.

Hence, any system of philosophy must first

of all be proven to be consistent.

But sheer consistency is

not sufficient, for if the philosophy does not pertain to
the actual world in which man has found himself , then his
philosophy is of no value to him.

So man must also be able

to observe the facts of sensory data which have come to him
in the totality of his experience.

The mistake of the ra-

tionalist has been the attempt which he has made to find a
rational relationship between the many parts of the empirically observed flux •
• • • Truth is a systematic account of reality.
We do not wait until we can see rat ional connections in reality before we affirm such reality. The reason for this is two-fold. First,
if we waited until we saw the rational connection between things, we would not know anything in nature. There is no demonstrable reason why one atom of oxygen and two atoms of
hydrogen should logically form that colorless
fluid called water. Science describes nature
by showing us that this combination al111ays
produces water, but there is no law of logic
which says that it must. Second, and here we
presuppose the Christian major premise, the
discrete facts of the empirical universe are
relat ed to each other, not by demonstrable
necessity, but the teleology. The world is
knit together according to >a plan which existed
in the mind of the Creator. The relation ,
therefore, be t ween the number of goats in Albania to the weight of the nearest star , or
the relation between the depth of the Atlantic
Ocean in its center to the death of Christ on
the cross, is teleological. God freely elected
to create the wor ld. There was no antecedent
compulsion, either from within or without,
which determined that God should make this
world, rather than another. God freely elected
to display His glory in this world, and the
motive behind the choice \vas that it pleased
God, this and none other. The present "TOrld is
a consistent world and it is the best world,
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because God mgde it; for God is consistency
and goodness.
Negatively, Carnell has attempted to prove that systematic consistency is the correct criterion for truth by exposing as inadequate other criteria which have been presented.
How well he actually has disproved each of the criteria is
a matter of conjecture, no doubt depending upon the reader's
personal attitude.

An illustration of one of the refutations

is sufficient to demonstrate how Carnell has handled each of
the tests for truth.
Custom is any habit or practice which has .
come to be associated with the uniform actions
of a given individual or group by reason of its
long continuance or uniformity, as saluting the
flag, or following certain rules of etiquette
while in Rome. But customs can be good or bad,
true or false. Something beyond and outside of
custom, therefore, must test the validity of
customs themselves.?
Let the reader suppose that he has just presented to one who
thoroughly believes in custom the argument just presented.
Throughout his lifetime, his ideals and purposes of life
have been centered around tradition and custom.
more, he has agreed to your definition of custom.

FurtherBut he

does not, nor will he ever agree with you that some customs
are good or bad, true or false.

It is intrinsically the

very basis of his belief that all customs are good and that
none are false.

One cannot prove the truth or falsity of

6.
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this claim unless there is brought to this assumption some
other criterion of truth upon which both can agree.

The

case of the above argument \vould simply end upon the

11

and

11

it isn ' t" sour note.

i t is"

The assumption which Carnell has

brought to all the tests of truth, and which he has used t o
defeat

the~,is

the very assumption which he has sought to

prove as the only valid test for truth.

This is indeed a

faux pas, for he assumed to be true that which he hopes to
prove true.

He has no l ogical grounds for this assumption,

though he probably has shown its superiority.
The law of contradiction is so basic to
meaningful thought and , consequently, to truth ,
for truth is concerned only with meaning, that
it cannot be demonstrated. The only proof for
the law is that nothing is meaningful without
the law ' s validity being presupposed. 8
Behind the assumption of the law of contradiction is
still another assumption.

For who can be certain that to-

morrow this same assumption will work.

Truth, in its very

nature, assumes that once applied, that every following opportunity will give you exactly the same results without
fear of contradiction.
of the truth?

What assures men of this regularity

The Christian assumption is that God is the

guarantor of truth.

Hence, to thiru{ truthfully, is simply

to think God's own thoughts after Him.
We say that the more perfect a mind is ,
the more perfect is the meaning that that
mind has in any act of judgment. The mother

8.
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is more perfect than the child, and the expert is more perfect than the mother (unless
the mother is an expert, too). When we carry
this through what mind is the most perfect
receptacle of all meaning? There is no alternative. It is God's mind, for such a mind
is His than which no greater may be conceived.
He, then, is truth, for, being perfect, He
cannot err. The meaning He gives to things
is absolute, for He is the Author of things.
Truth, therefore, is correspondence with the
mind of God. The test for truth is systematic
consistency, for God is consistent and the
world that He teleologically orders gives
system to this consistency. As we united
validity with experience, we have a perfect
test for truth.9
C.

THE NATURE AND PURPOSE OF FAITH

So far, Carnell has been primarily conqerned with some
of the difficulties connected with the reason as it is related to sensory experience.

Is this test for truth valid

when it comes to matters of faith?

Defining faith as "com-

mitment or trust ulO Carnell would not hesitate in answer-

'

ing this question in the affirmative.

One does not commit

himself to anything for which he has no apprehension.
have knowledge means that man must have truth.

To

To have the

truth implies that the test for truth must then be applied.
Second, and perhaps more to the point, a
straw-man opponent is attacked when faith and
knowledge· are antipathetically related. The
Bible is a system of propositions which address
the reason as decisively as any other faculty
in man. Kn9wledge is the light which clarifies

9.
10.
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the nature of things to which man ought to
be committed. Reason tests, segregates,
orders, and classifies. Proper commitment
does not follovl through until the whole man
is convinced of the reasonableness and coherence of a value proposition. I(nowledge
describes .and orders the alternatives, separating the worthy from the unworthy, the
good from the bad, the true from the false,
so that the hei1t may have an unambiguous
place to rest.
Faith then is limited by knowledge.
believe in the unknown.
knowledge.

One cannot trust in or

But faith means more than rational

It is commitment, a commitment that man himself

is not willing to make, indeed cannot ever make in his
power.

o~m

Special illumination is given by God Himself in the

witnessing He does directly to the heart of man and through
the truth of general revelation.
grace, the latter is common grace.

The former is special
Because of the latter

grace, all men everywhere should be convinced of the truth
of their own sinfulness, repent and turn to God •
• • • Faith is but a whole-soul trust in God's
word as true • • • The power by which the heart
is enabled to see that the word of God is true
is the Holy Spirit. The word of God is thus
self-authenticating. It bears its own testimony to truth; it seals its own validity. If
the word required something more certain than
itself to give it validity, it would no longer
be God's word. If God, by definition, is that
than which no truer may be conceived, then His
word is that than which no truer may be conceived. It would be a derogation to the efficiency of revelation to suppose that _a ny
more than God's Spirit is needed to seal the
the word to the hearts of believers • • • 12

11.
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Because God's word, that is the Bible or Holy Scriptures,
does not need any authentication than itself, will it therefore mean that the law o·f systematic consistency will not
apply?

This is not a contradiction, which might be supposed,

with the former statement that all knowledge must be systematically consistent.
harmonies with it.

Rather, it is in the greatest of all
For who could be more in accord \vith the

la\·1 of contradiction than its Author?

Apprehending of truth

means an imvard apprehending whether this be of faith or of
the world.

In matters of faith, however, special grace is

given to gain certitude that our hearts might be assured of
its truth.

But the test of truth must still be applied to

see that faith itself is consistent with general revelation.
Carnell has warned his readers that one dare not rest
in reason alone.

If he were to do this, then he is likely

to fall into the error of a cold fundamentalism.
doxy is a contradiction in itself.

Dead ortho-

To reach any kind of or-

thodox position, it is necessary to rely upon special_revelation.

But special revelation most certainly is not satis-

fied with mere rational assent.

The Bible teaches that man's

basic need is fellowship.
• • .Knowledge by inference is a handmaid to
knowledge by acquaintance. Man must employ
his mind with astuteness; he ~use the laws
of logic to guide him into paths that are rationally coherent, for contradictions he cannot assent to. We should only commit ourselves
to that which is rationally consistent. Foolishness we must not believe. But the highest
knowledge terminates in fellowship. Less than
this draws out less than the whole mano The
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Bible defends the primacy of reason as the
faculty through which all options must clear.
But it likewise teaches that formal rationality performs its job only when it remains
a humble voice in the vrilderness, preparing
the way for fellowship.l3
Fellowship has been presented by Carnell as the most
rational of acts.

It is the purpose of every rational evi-

dence which concernsitself about God.

When man has examined

that in which he is about to place his trust, and finding
the individual worthy of trust and commitment, even to one's
own benefit, the culmination of these rational acts could
only be fellowship.

Under such circumstances, to refuse

fellowship would be the irrational act.
When addressing the heart therefore, the
Scriptures use rationally intelligible propositions. Spirit can be led to the God worthy of
being worshiped only through the avenue of objectively veracious evidences. If our knowledge of God were discontinuous with good scientific-philosophic inquiry 1 we would never
know God at all. Faith in God is not generically different from faith in either another
individual or in the body of scientifically
veracious knovlledge. Generic faith is a resting of the mind in the sufficiency of the evidences. Saving faith may go beyond this
general expression, but it does not exclude it.
~fuoever does not first have g~neric faith can
hardly be said to possess the richer form. Even the highest surgings of spiritual ecstasy
own no powers which are free from the veto of
the understanding. "I will pray 1r.1i th the spirit
and I will pray with the mind also; I will sing
with the spirit and I will sing with the mind
also." (I Corinthians 14:15) If Biblical
Christianity rested on rational paradox or absurdity, it 'I.<TOuld quickly reduce to foolishness. 14
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Carnell has described this act of fellowship as the
third locus of truth.

In philosophy, one is limited to only

two loci.

The first locus is "the sum total of reality it-

self."l5

The second locus is the proposition which the phi-

losopher made when experience has been examined in the crucible of the reason and found to be systematically consistent with the total of reality.

But the third locus of truth

which Christianity brings to the forefront, is the truth
found in the heart.

This is fellmvship.

Thus it is not

sufficient for man to be satisfied simply to know that there
is truth around him.

He must grasp that truth by making and

proving rational propositions concerning that truth and thus
to have the truth itself.

But this is still not enough to

satisfy the desperate need of man's existence.
form to real existence.

He must be truth.

He must con-

This conformation

- was most highly exemplified in Christ, but in a lesser degree
must every true Christian also conform.
The Christian philosophy of truth may be
summarized as follows: (a) Reality "out there 11
is the truth. This universe is trul~ God's
creation. (b) Truth is a property of a judgment or proposition which corresponds to reality. The mind of God forms a perfect system
of truth. "Thy word is truth." (John 17:17)
Finite minds approach this perfection only by
degrees, by systems of thought, in short.
Since their systems are never complete, however, propositional truth can never pass beyond probability. (c) Truth in the heart is
a quality of personal character which coincides
with the law of love. Love is the stuff which

15.

Ibid.

81
forms the character of God. Men become the
truth as their character becomes good.l 6
D.

THE THOMISTS REFUTED

One of the serious difficulties which faced Carnell was
how sensory data became meaningful.

How was it possible for

man to make predications concerning that which he has observed, expecting them to be normative for future experience?

If man were not able to do this, science, faith, and

reason would not be possible.
Carnell has emphatically rejected the purely empirical
approach of the Thomists.

That which has eliminated the fa-

mous proofs of God from rational thinking, is the Thomistic
insistence that nothing exists in the mind other than which
has come through the senses.

Since space is limited so that

Carnell's full discussion of the proofs is impossible, the
following two arguments seem sufficient to give the crux of
the whole matter.
1. Em2iricism ends in skepticism. Hume
took Thomas' dictum, nihil est in intellectu
nisi prius fuerit in ~~' seriously and
showed that by it nothing normative can be
found •. If all the mind has to work with are
sense-perceptions as reports to the mind of
what is going on in the external world, knowledge can never rise to the universal and the
necessary, for from flux only flux can come •• • 17
2.

Principle Qt economy eliminates the

16.
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Christian God. Hume has set the pace for all
empiricists by dictating that the cause be proportionate to the effect, meaning that one
may inductively introduce no more to explain
an effect than a cause great enough ~o account
for the effect, but no greater • • • 1
The Thomistic empiricists have twice violated the rule of
contradiction.

This was more than enough to force their

system into disfavor.

St.

Thomas Aquinas was blind to the

a priori concepts which he had brought into his system.

It

was no accident that such proofs were developed only in a
Christian world.

Since all admit that universals are not

actually the object of sense data, from when did they come?
All one can ever hope to do is to give a series :of disconnected impressions if he were to rely solely upon empirical
observation.

In the same sense,

emptr~cal

perceptions can-

not, even at very best, possibly account for a cause which
is greater than that which is required t o produce a given
effect.

According to sensory data alone, the God who created

matter must either have exhausted Himself in this creation,
or one can know very little about Him through sensory perception alone.

Under no circumstances, could the God real-

ized through sensory perception be the One of Infinite Power
vri th \ihom Christians claim to fellowship.
E.

POSITIVISH' S LIHITATIONS

With this analysis before us, the views of modern positivism should be examined in the light of what Carnell has
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to say about them.

Carnell is under continual obligation

by the formula which he himself ha s chosen, continually to
do battle with all rival systems of thought.

Not only must

he do battle, but he must prove that the systems which he
opposes are fraught with more and greater difficulties than
his own, or he himself will be a vic t im of his own criteria.
Modern Positivism began to be popular during the period
of the Rennaissance.

Casting aside every a priori conce.p t,

the Rennaissance mind began to study the cosmos \vith great
intensity.

Once the a priori was fully cast aside, the

scientific method and science herself were in a position to
dominate the lives and minds of the men of the western world.
The new method, instead of glancing at a leaf and therefrom
deducing the entire nature and attributes of God, began to
examine the cosmos with the expectation of finding results
which would influence the here and now.

This was not man's

attempt to submit himself to God, but to submit the forces
of nature unto himself.
A glance at this chart will show that
positivism has carried Kant's epistemology
to its logical conclusion. Only factual propositions -- those which science can process
in the laboratory by an operational experiment terminate on reality. The rest may involve either a wish or just plain imagination.
Non-cognitive meanings perhaps have the pragmatic value of getting people to do things in
their practical life or of giving them solace
in poetry and religion, but they have no informational function. They leave the formal
and quantitative for the biological and qualitative. While they sometimes express how we
feel or how we wish things were, only factually
meaningful propositions can suggest experimental
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operations. John Dewey describes the steps
in this epistemology as follows: A felt
difficulty in our experience; careful clarification of what the difficulty is; careful
preparation of hypotheses to account for a
solution; mental elaboration through definite if/then cause-sequence relations; and
a final testiny through actual observation
Qt. experiment. 9
From the a priori bondage characterizing Thomistic
empiricism, positivism has been fettered with the bondage
of .the a posteriori.

~Vhereas

the a priori philosophy scarce-

ly glanced at nature, the new philosophy cannot get its eyes
away from the cosmos.

Unless a statement is subject to the

direct scrutiny which can take place under the carefully
controlled conditions of a laboratory, it can be said to
have no bearing upon reality.

Ethics, prayers, metaphysics,

appeals, or other such statements, though of value in the
emotive sense, bear no relationship to reality.
And so the swing of the pendulum has been
completed. In classical philosophy the only
sentence worth-while ~ the normative, while
in modern scientific empiricism the normative
is altogether disclaimed. Men once believed
they could reach reality through data intuited
by the inner light; positivism knows only the
light of science. It was previously supposed
that propositions were objectively true whether
or not they could ever be carried out into concrete experience; positivism now scorns the
notion as prescientific. No statement is fa25
tual which cannot terminate on an operation.
Carnell does not fail to demonstrate that the basis of

19.
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Positivism is a contradiction to the criteria set up for

tr~th. 21 It is impossible to verify the statement in the
laboratory that all statements must be verifiable in a laboratory experiment which terminates in an operation.

Hence,

that statement that all statements which terminate in an
operation are cognitive, is no more than emotive language
and could only be used religiously, ethically, or perhaps
prayerfully.

And besides, since the idea of truth is not

cognitive, hovT can anyone be certain whether the reports
which other scientists bring out of the laboratory are true
or false?

Or even worse, if one were reasonably assured

that the previous scientist has reported accurately, by 1tlhat
method could he be certain that it would be true tomorrow
since science knows only what it observes?

If it would take

for granted that the basic sentence that all statements to
be factual must terminate in an operation were true today ,
hO\v could one ever be certain of tomorrovl?

One can never

put tomorrow in a laboratory.
Carnell has pushed Positivism into an even worse predicament than this.

Since it has recognized no ultimate

values, one can well ask Positivism what the purpose of the
accumulation of so great data is.

One searches in vain in

the laboratory for some presupposition which might infer the
moral limitations of laboratory findings' uses.

21.
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moral values, without Christianity, Positivism possesses

-

within itself the power for its mm destruction.

Though

this destruction may terminate in someone's laboratory, unfortunately the destruction may be so devastating that
there might be a shortage of laboratory technicians for
proper recording of statistics so that in the final analysis this destruction itself would have very little to do
with reality, but would be only of emotive value.
There is little doubt but what scientific
empiricists are (in general) most amiable and
pleasant individuals, ones who would be first
in their 0\vn actions to disclaim violence and
destruction. But that is not the point. The
point is that in his teaching, the positivist
is undermining the very moral and spiritual
vitalities upon which our culture was founded
and which alone can dignify man. His personal
piety may stem from his Christian heritage, but
where shall the piety of his pagan students
come from? Certainly it cannot come from positivi sm. It ··~ must come from a structure of values which disavows the pretension that all cognitive sentences are resolved by operations.
Respect for human dignity, respect for justice,
the preference of truth to error, goodness to
wickedness, beauty to ugliness are normative
values 'vhich have a priori justification. \'iho
will be around to check the results if the follovJing sentence is carried out into an experiment: "Destroying civilization through hydrogen bombs is a bad thing." In this instance
truth crushed to earth will not rise again,
for no scie~~ists will remain to construct new
operations.
From the foregoing facts, Carnell is persuaded that as surely as Christianity needs science, so science has ample need
for Christianity.

22.
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general revelation and amass the facts of nature.

This very

important task must not be depreciated as it was in the a
priori Thomistic empiricism.

But science needs the resources

of Christianity to lay the metaphysical groundwork for laboratory science.

Through Christianity alone, can these factors

be amalgamated into a systematic coherent viewpoint of reality and thus be assured of their usefulness to society.
This is what we mean by rapprochement between Christianity and the scientific method.
Without the help of the scientific method,
Christianity cannot make accurate contact with
the details of God's providential working in
nature; and without Christianity, science has
no metaphysical, epistemological, or ethical
frames of reference within which to give,worldview meaning to the facts it colligates.-j
F.

THE NATURE OF TRUTH

In previous discussion, it has been noted that truth
can be said to reside in three loci.

For epistemological

purposes, only the first two are of importance.

These two

loci are the truth which resides in nature, and the truth
which might be predicated concerning them.

Positivism and

Thomistic empiricism have demonstrated their inability logically, that is without contradiction, to united predication with the truth which actually resides in reality.
The truth which men have is, of course, the truth which
rests in propositions or statements about reality.

23.
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cannot have the truth in reality itself, for it ever remains
in actuality.

Only in propositions about reality which he

believes to be true, can man hope to have the truth about
reality~

One can make an assertion or proposition about

sugar-coated sweet peas but he can never actually take them
into his mind.

So man must carefully check whatever state-

ments he might make against the actual reality of sugartoasted sweet peas as he has observed them empirically.

How-

ever, because of man's inability, and because of the nature
of that which man wishes to verify, he cannot have absolute
certainty that his propositions about reality are true.
best, he can have only probability.

At

Even in a laboratory,

as men carefully measure again and again, they will never obtain exactly the same answer twice.

The answers must be writ-

ten in graphic form so that the mean may be obtained which
is considered very near to t he correct answer.
only probably the right answer.

Yet it is

In real life situations,

so many causal factors enter into a situation, that one :can
never be absolutely certain that he has eliminated them all
as possible participants in the produced effect.

Because

Christianity is historical, it is impossible to demonstrate
that which it holds true, for history never can be repeated.
All one can do is gather historical witnesses to the facts,
then he has probable knowledge.

But this probable knowledge

is just as much at home in the laboratory as it is in the
field of ethics or Christian dogmatics.
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First, let us establish securely the
fact that proof for the Christian faith, as
proof for any world-view that is worth talking about, cannot rise above rational probability. Probability is that state of coherence in which more evidences can be corralled
for a given hypothesis than can be amassed
against it. The more the evidences increase,
the more the strength of probability increases.24
Even the Positivists must agree to this statement, for their
world vie\v cannot be proven beyond doubt.

Of course, to

agree with this statement would also make the Positivist
contradict himself.

But Christ cannot be declaimed simply

because He cannot be observed today.

If we were to dis-

count Christianity's claim on such a basis, history would
be impossible.

To discover historical truths, historical

evidences must be carefully weighed before decision can be
made.

In the case of world views, since to be a world view

at all they must account for history, this is the only method
possible.
For some reason, not all theologians have
seen that rational probability and perfect
moral, or subjective, assurance are quite compatible. The Ritschlians went headfirst into
f ·e eling theology, believing that "the characteristic certitude of the religious believer
tends to be impaired, at least temporarily,
when the doctrines of the faith upon which he
has been building his life and his hopes for
the future are treated as mere metaphysical
theories, to be tested by their rationality
and their agreement with empirical fact."
This divorce of faith and rationality has given
the coup de grace to modernism, for faith without objectively verifiable truth is comparable
to the sort of certainty which goes along with

24.
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snake-handlers, sunadorers, and esoteric faithhealing cults of sundry species. That private
insight which exclaims, "I have it but I cannot express it," is not the type of coherence
which is necessary for science. Faith must be
founded in objectively verifiable metaphysical
theories even if they fail to provide perfect
demons~ra~ion.
Apart from this, theology has
no log1c. ?
G.

THE STRUCTURE OF THE HIND

During the ensuing discussion, an attempt will be made
to examine the starting point of the epistemological theory
which Carnell purports to be correct.

This paper has dealt

already with two view which have for their synoptic point
effable external experience. 26

In both cases, the attempt

was made to show that neither their conclusions were warranted
by their starting point, nor their basis was adequate upon
which to build any structure which purported to be a world
view.

According to the probability theory of knowledge,

Carnell discarded these two theories in favor of internal
effable experience. 27 The only other option for a synoptic
point, internal ineffable experience, 28 is not worthy of
discussion since it is nothing but mysticism and has no relation to reality.

It cannot, therefore, be proven or
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disproven, but it has, as a result, no real relationship to
actuality.
Since sensory experience is limited to the flux, and
from flux only flux can come, Carnell has posited in· the
mind that which makes sensory experience meaningful.
2. Internal effable experience. Not all
experience in the soul is incapable of being
expressed in words. As the histor y of rationalism proves, myriad are those keen minds which
have been convinced that through a search of
the soul's resident abilities universal and
necessary principles, which are independent
of sense perception, can be located and plotted.
This is the course which the Christian will
follow, so let us bypass it fo r the time being to return to it later. The security of
this position is not to be confused with mysticism 1 s ·'ineffable subjectivism, however, for
by the method of effable internal experience,
"a truth is seen in its relations to other
knowledge, and so with something of the certainty that goes with demonstration," but it
is "no unique and mystical warrant that guarantees it, but mere coher ence.n2;J
Christian Rationalism, as Carnell has termed this position, has held that normative truths, such as the Good,
the True and the Beautiful, depend upon innate knovrledge.
After looking upon the flux of nature, how does man decide
what is beautiful?

Certainly, his sensation does not give

a criteria alone for this.

It is only innate knowledge

which can assure one of the finality of truth and of goodness.

This innate knowledge has been termed the "rationes 11

which Carnell believes can be identified with the scriptural
doctrines of the image of God which is in man.

29.
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This structure blends nicely into the
Christian doctrine of creation, for man is
made in the image and after the likeness of
God. Christ is the true Light which enlightens every man. The Christian shares the conviction of Descartes, therefore, that "one
certainly ought not to find it strange that
God, in creating me, placed this idea (God)
within me to be like the rna~~ of the workman imprinted on his work; and it is likewise not essential that the mark shall be
something different from the work itself." • • • 3°
Having relied wholly upon sensation for knowledge, the
empiricist has always involved himself with the difficulty
of the finality of truth.

If all truth and knowledge are

subject to fluctuation, why then is not their basic premise
also subject to the same conditions?

But by its very nature,

it has already been demonstrated that this type of premise
cannot be sustained by the very criteria which is purports
to lay down.

Hence, all empiricists are involved in an

initial contradiction which cannot be resolved.

It is im-

possible to start with any other synoptic point other than
that of internal effable experience.
Empiricists of all sorts are faced with another difficult explanation.

Who is the one who observes, and upon vrhom

do sensations have effect?

Is there such a thing as mind,

and if there is, how can I know it simply through empirical
observation alone?

The depths of mind can never be known

by empirical methods because instead of being the object of
sensations, the mind is always the recipient of all sensation.

30.
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• • • It lies in the very nature of the case
that the self can never become the object of
experience, because the self, whatever else
it might be, is in the indefeasible situation of being the subject of experience. A
knowledge of the self seems, then, in the
very nature of the case fore-doomed. However, the tti think" is quite inescapable and
it is not sufficiently ac1ounted for inHume's
laws of association • • • j
Knowledge of self, the existence of the mind, can never be
explained satisfactorily by empiricists.
are an enigma.

The rules of logic

Certainly these a priori laws have never been

fully accounted for by the sensationalists •
• • • In order to think clearly, men are obliged
to accept the validity of certain laws of thought.
These would include: the Principle of Identity,
that we must stick to our meaning or definitions
throughout an argument; the Principle of Contradiction, that two contradictory propositions
cannot both be true; and the Principle of Sufficient Reas?n, that ~here must be a cause of
every happen~ng • • • 3
From these laws of logic which give to all of life's
sensation their meaning, man became aware of the existence
of God.

God cannot be deduced from the flux alone, but He

can be deduced from the changeless, eternal rules of logic .
From the awareness of the soul of its own
endowments it knows God, for only a trans-temporal, trans-spatial Mind can sustain the timeless character of logic. We have not elected
to be logical; another has made us that way.
The smoothest hypothesis to account for this
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making is, not the brute bumping of undirected atoms, but the creation of man in
the image of God. This is the structure the
Christian chooses to follow, for he believes
the postulate of a rational God to be a workable 1·:\p~pothesis in the light of the evidence.33
Knowledge of self in quite a different way makes us avrare
of God.

Not only is man made aware that there must be a

God because he does not resemble nature, but also because
he does resemble the flux, hence unlike God •
• • • Without the aid of sensation, man knows
that he is finite, dependent, and wretched;
. but these adjectives would be absolutely
meaningless \d thout a prior knm..rledge of their
correlatives, infinity, independence, and felicity. These belong to God alone. 11To knovr
self implies, therefore, the co~knowledge with
self of that on which it derives, by the standard of which its imperfection is revealed, to
\vhich it is responsible." We knmo~ God as that
Being over against Whom \ve are perpetually set,
upon Whom we completely depend, and to Whom we
are finally responsible. All of this we knovr
from a knowledge of our own finite, sinful, infelicitous condition • • • 3~
But the rationes not only bids us be a'vare of God because of ourselves, but because of General Revelation.

With-

out the presupposi.tion, or the existence of the a priori,
a demonstration such as Thomas attempted would be impossible.
• • • If we knmo1 not the truth before coming to
sensation the world is neither rational nor
irrational, for the terms are meaningless. If
we know not the standard for good, the world
is neitmr good nor bad. So \vith beauty, it
is neither lovely nor ugly. But these criteria
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depe~~

God.

for their existence upon the mind of

Though man catches the meaning of nature and of general revelation, he is hindered from actirgupon his knowledge in a
rational manner because of his

0\1n

defection.

Seeing the

beauty of the lilies, man should cast himself prostrate at
the feet of God, but sin has always prevented him from pure
rational insight.
Because he speaks of both "natural" revelation7 i.e., the revelation of the meaning
of reality in the facts of time and space,
and "special 11 revelation, i.e., the propositional content of the Bible, the Christian
can meaningfully speak of the "incompetence"
of the human reason. The reason of man, in .
addition to being partially corrupted because
of sin, is incompetent to work out a complete
view of God and man because it, in ~ts unaided
state, is not supplied with enough information to complete its philosophy. The data
which special revelation supplies is needed
to supplement the data which natural revelation displays. • .Just as the intellect of
man is incompetent to demonstrate that there
is another side of the moon, because of the
inaccessibility of the data, so also it is
incompetent to complete a philosophy of life
without special revelation from God. Because of our sinful hearts, which vitiate
the evidence of nature, a more sure voice is
needed to lead us into a theory of reality
which is horizontally self-consistent and
which vertically fits the facts.36
Because of the rationes, man has been able to do many
good things, propound many good philosophies, and make religions which contain many truths.
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But because of sin, none
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of them contain the whole truth.

None of them contain truth

only, for all of them are truth mixed with error.

Only by

special revelation, could all men's quest for happiness be
satisfied.

It answers the question of death itself and

assures all men of the hope of life eternal.
revelation is none other than the Bible.

This special

Its appeal is

worded strongly, and directed toward the rationes so as to
be irresistably logical.

No other form of philosophy or

religion can possibly make this claim •
• • • From Genesis through Revelation, these
men wrote sober truth. One self-consistent,
historically accurate, plan of salvation runs
through their hundreds of pages of manuscripts
which, astoundingly, were written by men relatively ignorant of the existence of each other.
Hoses gave the plan of salvation in Genesis
3:15, thousands of years before its fulillment: "I will put enmity between thee and the
woman, and between thy seed and her seed: he
shall bruise thy head, and thou shalt bruise
his heel." The prophets passionately unfolded
it; the gospels carefully outlined it; and the
epistles immacul ately completed it. Toward
the end of s pecial revelation, Paul said, "The
God of peace will soon crush Satan under your
feet" (Romans 16:20), pointing to the last
jot-and-tittle fulfillment of Genesis 3:15.
In t his entire system of salvation there is
nothing repulsive to the reason of .'man; there
is nothing impossible, immoral, absurd nothing inconsist~ut vlith the corpus of vreil-attested truth • .:S"I
H.

THE BIBLE

Equating the Bible with Special Revelation, Carnell

37.

Ibid., p. 179.
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must face the difficulties of" higher and lower criticism
with which neither Barth nor Brunner were forced to contend.
Higher and lower criticism has proported to find many errors
in the Bible, so many in fact, that the Bible could not possibly be accepted by a rational man.

These errors are both

historical inaccuracies and errors in logic.

Carn~ll

admitted that the Bible does contain many problems.

has

To not

admit them is simply to deny the facts •
• • • These efforts have left the conservatives
in a predicament. On the one hand, he admits
that the Bible is the infallibly inspired word
of God, and yet, on the other, confesses that
there are not a few difficulties in the present text. "The conscientious student has,
therefore, great difficulty sometimes in resolving problems raised by apparent contradictions • • • and he may frankly confess that
he is not able to explain an apparent discrepancy in the teaching of Scripture." To the
modern mind the conservative position seems
like weaseffi-wording.3~
Carnell has avoided much of the difficulty by limiting
infallibility to only the original autographs.

As the Bible

is a very ancient book, this would mean that it was subject
to a great many errors in the process of copying which took
place.

As the living Word of God was broken at the hands

of sinful men, so also has been the fate of the "rri tten word
of God.

As general revelation was marred by sin, so also

was special revelation.

But as in general revelation, there

has remained sufficient truth in special revelation to bring
all men to repentance.

38.

Ibid., p. 191.
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Christian religion is built, are not

2

subject to the dis-

pute.
Christianity knows no contradiction of
its radicals. All the work of the higher
critic has fallen short of refuting the system from this perspective. As for the minor
difficulties, we appeal to the complicated
character of realityt the parallels to sci?nce, and the §~ct or our o-vm finitude and
~ gnorance.
• •
Carnell's basic assumption is then, that the original
documents, not copies nor translations, were inspired .

This

is a rather difficult theory either to prove or to disprove
with finality since none of the autographs are available for
scrutiny.

The reasons for believing must be purely rational

ones since no empirical evidence exists.

On this assumption

Carnell's basic argument is that if God did not deliver to
man infallible words then either He would not and was intentionally deceiving man, or that He could not, hence was
only a fini te God.

For if God could not, then there must

be some force greater than He which was preventing Him from
doing as He wished.

The reason for errors in the copies,

was the sinfulness of the copyers •
• • • Thirdly, permitting ·man to fall into tran~
scriptional error in so holy and religious an
assignment as copying the originally inspired
manuscripts, is the highest possible testimony
to that complete penetration into our inward
lives that sin enjoys, and shows that, no matter how hard a zealot may concentrate, pray, ·
and petition for grace, he still falls shor~

39.
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p. 209.

99
of the immaculate Son of God. • • 4-o
At first glance, one might be satisfied with this explanation ·o f the problem, but this investigator seriously questions the value of such an explanation.

Looking at the

issue from one point of view, the sceptic would ask if God
were not limited in that He could not preserve the copies
made from error1

If God could give us infallible auto-

graphs through sinful men, why not faithful copies through
sinful men?

From the other point of view, if the copyists

were sinful men and erred because they could not reach the
perfection of the Son of God, why did not the original
writers also err for were they not also sinners such as we
and not gods?

Certainly, the scriptures cannot be denied

to reflect the fact that human personality influenced not
only what was said, but the manner in which it is ··e xpressed.
The answer which Carnell has given to this question is that
God elected not to have the copyists inspired, just as He
elected to let His perfect universe fall into partial corruption.41

This would lead us into further difficulties

which will be discussed in the problem of evil.
Having retreated, Carnell has still another dilemma
which he has not solved.

If only the radicals are not touched

by modern higher criticism, who is to define the radicals?

4-o.

Ibid., p. 199.

41.

Ibid., p. 198.
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If only the radicals remain why then not only the radicals
inspired if that is all that is necessary?

Hume•s rule of

efficient cause would certainly imply that this would be
true.

Since error has entered into Revelation, and all

error is evil, then the whole issue is bound to the question
of moral evil.

Let us turn to this chapter in Carnell and

attempt to determine hmv he \vould solve the problem.

The

basic proposition of Christianity, the God who has revealed
Himself in Holy Scriptures, is at stake on t his issue.
I.

THE PROBLEM OF EVIL

Carnell has made the fact of the Personality of God
basic to the understanding of the problem of evil.

As a

Person, God is not an impersonal rule of changeless logic,
but makes free decisions. 42 One of these free decisions,
was the creation of the world.

God is never under necessity

for necessity would mean that He lacked something in Himself.43

The creation of God was a perfect creation, re-

flecting the majesty and the glory of God.

But into crea-

tion, man and angels have brought the fact of sin.
::. · · Into this perfect universe, man and angel
brought sin and disruption through their defection from the Divine commands. The creature,
therefore, not God, is responsible for all of
the sin and sorrow which make up both natural

42.

Ibid., p. 293.

43.
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and moral evil • • • 44
But Christianity avows that before Creation, God had a plan
for the redemption of the world.

This was not an emergency

plan in the case sin did occur, for this would limit the
fore-knowledge of God, making Him finite.

Sin was not only

knmvn by God, but it came about only because it was divinely
_ decreed.
• •• This means that God infallibly knew that,
if He created man upon earth, man would fall
into sin and require the restoring merits of
the God-Man, Jesus Christ; and yet He vrent
right ahead and created man in the garden of
Eden. The crucifixion, ~ worst examp~~ of
evil, was not only permitted by God; it ~
sovereignl~ decreed • • • In history, then,
there is no surd, inexplicable, or antinomy.
History is as rational at every point as the
rational God Who decrees its movement. There
is no strength but what comes from the strength
of Israel; there i~ no being but what stems
from the Almighty. 5
If God has decreed evil, why should men then resist it?
Carnell answers, simply because God has so commanded men to
act.46

Then the Almighty, All-Pow~rful, All-Sustaining God

has not only always enabled the powers of Good but the powers
of evil.

Why then cannot man call God before the courtroom

and in solemn assembly commit Him to be banished forever _
from the universe? . Did He not decree the greatest of all

44.

Ibid., p. 294.

45.

Ibid., p. 295.

46.

Ibid., p. 299.
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evils?
ble?

But Carnell answers, to v1hom would God be respon siAs Sovereign God , He cannot be held accountable to

anyone for His actions.

Because He is not responsible to

anyone or anything, how can God be responsible for sin?
is God who is right and not man.

It

God does not have to do

good exactly as society conceives the good.

If He were

limited in any such way, then He would be a finite god, His
actions having been controlled by the reason of man.

Though

man through reason cannot account for anything good except
that \'lhich is bound to the ten commandments, yet God 1 s actions
are not so bound.

The rightness or wrongness of an action

then is plainly whether or not God has placed His approval
upon that act.
In short, the decalogue is of force only
where sinners are concerned; but God is the
Holy One. Of what, then, does Mill speak "ilhen
He says that God must possess the same moral
attributes which one finds in a good man here
in society? God cannot be compared to ma~~ it
is man that is to be compared to God • • • t
Does the v10rld seem to fall short of man's expectations?

Does one wish that sin did not exist?

Then he en-

visions a world which God does not and never did see. .For
this world is the best possible of all worlds •
• • • The universe, with all of the evil in
it, is the best possible of all worlds, for
the very reason that God, the standard of
good, has called it good. But it is part
of the goodness of this universe that the

47.

Ibid., p. 310.
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sin which God permitte~ to enter that He
might display His grace and love to the sons of
men, is to be extirpata~ by the death of His
Son, Jesus Christ • • •
Is it possible that God did intend for sin to emerge
into the universe?

Carnell affirms that He did.

Since it

is logical that God is an Absolutely free individual, Carnell
argued that He can do as He chooses.

Since He is all Power-

ful and could have prevented sin, He chose that sin should
exist in the universe since that is the only possible 1.vay
that it could exist.
Should one persist in his affirmation
that God did not intend to create a world
in which sin would emerge, 1.ve can only ask
where this one has received his information
on the subject. Unless he appeals to a private revelation which cannot be checked by
the law of contradiction, we know of no
source. It does not come from an analysis
of history, for history bears out that Christ
did die on the cross. If God did not want
Him to do so, then we are back on the finite
God position and we have no hope. And the
Bible certainly does not teach God was displeased with the death of Christ. On the
contrary, "it aleased Jehovah to bruise him. • •
he shall see of the travail of his soul, and
shall be satisfied" (Isaiah 53:10-11). Logic
cannot be appealed to, for vle have else1.vhere
shown that it is logical to suppose that God
is free to do what He wants without being
called into account. Vfuat new source, then,
does our objector appeal to? Until it is
forthcoming, we cannot continue the argument
at this point.4-9
At two very difficult points, Carnell leaves his reader with
unanswered questions.

What does Carnell mean by the holiness

l+~.L~ ·

Ibid. ; . pr;.o ~oo.

49.

Ibid., p. 304.
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of God?

Certainly this answer cannot be rational i n the

light of what has prece eded.

In addition, how does Carnell

define the freedom of man, which he had already averred,50
and still be consistent with his theory of divine decrees
which govern history?

If one were to ask Carnell the ques-

tion, who is responsible for sin, man or God, Carnell certainly has thrown his effort on the side which attempts t o
blame God.
Carnell's position, which might be described as
Christian Rationalism, might be summarized as an attempt to
place and to find the proper emphasis and balance upon both
the a pr iori and the a posteriori.

The a priori,which enables

man to make predications concerning that vlhich he is a\vare
of emp i rically, is made identical with the Biblical image
of God in man.

Wherever the s e predications conform to re-

ality, it may be said that man has the truth.

Because of

man's limitations, he is unable through this method to complete a philosophy which adequately includes all of reality.
Hence, God has Divinely revealed that which man must know
to complete his philosophy, which revelation also appeals
to the human reason.

Thus it may be said that the basis of

faith, \vhich Carnell defines as trust or comiili tment, is the
reason.

Without r ea son there can be no faith.

However, it

may be seriously questioned whether Carnell can defend his
view through reason.

50.

Carnell, Philosophy of the Christian Religion, p. 16.

CHAPTER

V

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
A.

DISTINCTIVE FEATURES OF THE STUDY

A purported new theology ha s sprung into existence during the past few decades.

Like Conservative theology ·, it

has claimed direct descendence from the reformers.

In like

manner, it has made its appeal to the Word of God for direction and guidance.

But is this new theology really a return

to reformation teachings?

Certainly, without fear of denial,

it can be said that it has been a return to reformation termino~ogy.

Unfortunately, the appearance of theological ter-

minology alone does not guarantee the validity of the claim
of this new theology.

Terminology must be examined in the

light of its context, and in this way the concept which lies
behind the use of the terms might be learned.

Again, one

would be forced to concede that the new theology has evidenced a desire to return to the methods of the reformers.
In this respect, it has emphasized the importance and the
sacredness of the pulpit and the calling of the ministry.

A

new and vital function has been given to the field of dogmatic theology.

But when one has examined these points of

similarity, there is still the certain feeling that one has
not really gotten to the issue.

It has not yet been raised.

The point of cont act upon which this study has chosen
to force the issue, is the relationship of faith and reason
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as found in the t'I:J'O leading continental proponents of the
new theology.

Of course, these concepts never appear in

isolation and can only be judged by their appearance in the
over-all system.

Hence, it has been a conclusion of this

paper, that a complete understanding of the intended relationship of reason:··and faith cannot be under stood without
some basic understanding of and use of their basic terminology.

As a summary, some of the terminology which has appeared
frequently in the reading will be examined, and its use, as
well as it can be determined, succinctly given.

In this

way, the relatj.onship of fai t:P and reason as considered by
each of these men will be brought to focus.
1.

Karl Barth
a.

Philosophy - A complete philosophy of the

world is not possible.

The antinomies of existence are be-

yond the scope of reason, their solution being known to God
alone.

The relationship of theology and philosophy is pure-

ly negative.
b.

God - God is the Wholly Other.

can He be considered as a part of this world.

In no sense
He must di-

rectly reveal to each individual all that can be known about
Him.

As a Revealing God, He is bound by no restrictions

whatsoever.
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c.
ships.

History - History has no rational relation-

No theory of its development, and hence its culmina-

tion is possible.
d.
man.

Revelation - Revelation is God speaking to

It is always accompanied by an act of history or na-

ture in such a way that it can be mistaken by man as that
act alone.

Primarily, revelation occurs in three forms: The

Bible, Proclamation, and the Sacraments.

Revelation is gi-

ven to meet the needs of a specific individual at a specific
occasion.
e.

Biblical Criticism - A critical study of the

Bible is justified, since the Bible as a part of the world,
is a finite book.
criticism.

This pertains to both higher and lower

Its conclusions are not really a matter of con-

cern since God can use any portion of the Bible He wishes
no matter what the critics might say concerning it.
f.

The World -The World is not God.

it, in anyway, resembles Him.
be learned of God.

Nothing in

From the world, nothing can

The basic reason for this is that the

world is limited, relative, and finite.
g.
istence.
escape.

Evil - Evil is an integral part of human ex-

It is a condition from which man cannot hope to
Man is not God, therefore, he is evil.
h.

similarity.

Image of God - Bet\veen Irian and God there is no
There is no point of contact between the two,

nothing inherent in man which makes him particularly receptive to the \·lord of .God.
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i.

Theology - This is an attempt to ascertain

the true message of God.

There is no assurance that the

church, by application of theology, will ever be able to
arrive at final truth.

The Church cannot even be sure that

she is even approaching it.

The basic presuppositions to

theology are faith and revelation.
j.

God.

Faith - Faith is the reception of the Word of

It is the recognition that reason cannot of itself and

by itself solve the radical problems of life.

Though faith

is the reception of the Word of God, it does not comprehend
its nature.
k.

That is the divine mystery.
Reason - Reason is the ability of man to or-

ganize the data which comes to it through the experiences of
life.

Though comprehension and understanding are possible,

reason is frustrated whenever it attempts to resolve the
great dialectical antinomies of the world into a coherent
system.
2.

This is the miracle of God.
Emil Brunner
a.

Philosophy - Philosophy is possible as far as

it is related to the present world.

In this realm, reason

is supreme.
b.

God - God is Absolute Person.

As Person, He

can only be known as He reveals Himself in personal encounter.
c.

History - History is of importance only as it

bears relationship to the person of Christ.
forms, preparation and fulfillment.

It has two
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d.

Revelation - Revelation is two fold.

There

is an original or general revelation by which man can know
the law.

This makes man responsible, hence a sinner.

But

general revelation is inadequate to create in man a new will,
so that man has never fulfilled the requirements of the law.
God can not be knO\m
Encounter.

s~.YS1

as He reveals Himself in Personal

The supreme revelation of God is Jesus Christ.

He is the Word of God.
e.

Biblical Criticism - Within limits, Biblical

criticism · is beneficial.

Criticism has served to breakdmm

the Bibliolatry of conservative Christianity.

However,

Biblical criticism is limited to that which pertains to this
world only.

Concerning that which pertains to God, criticism

has no validity.

This step, when taken, is to be deplored

since it is the rearing of the ugly head of autonomy.
f.

The

~vorld

- Though man 1 s knowledge of the

world is relative, this is basically caused by the sinfulness of his reason.

The world bears upon it the imprint of

its creator, which is the divine law for man.
g.

Evil - Evil is the positive rejection by man

of the Lordship of God.
self autonomous.

It is man's attempt to make him-

Its manifestation is the attempt to sub-

jugate all things to the human reason.
· h.

Image of God - Used in the moral sense, the

image of God has been destroyed in man.

But in the purely

formal sense, it has · not been destroyed.

Reason, which is

the basis of the image, is not lost.

What has been lost is
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the right use of reason.
i.

Theology - Dogma should not be allowed to be-

come fixed as it has become in conservative theology.
in certain limits it should be allowed to fluctuate.

WithIf it

is allowed to crystallize, dogma rather than God becomes the
object of faith.

Dogma is only useful as a sign which points

to the person of Christ and changes should be made whenever
necessary to serve this function.
j.

Faith -Faith is personal encounter with Christ.

It leaps over history to confrontChrist as Lord.
which sets reason aright.
reason.

It is faith

It preserves the true· .character of

The sinfulness of the individual is completely re-

alized in this act, and he commits himself to complete trust
in the "power of God.

k.
to this world.

Reason

Reason; by its very natur e 5

Reason convinces men of guilt.

the law of God in nature.
God.

s limited

It perceives

Its very function reminds one of

Though reason can bring man to the point of despair,

it is only by faith and the act of personal encounter than
man ever knows God.

3.

E.J. Carnell
a.

Philosophy - By its very nature, philosophy

should and can account for all the facts.

This refers both

to the things of this world, and to God.
b.

God - God is Sovereign Person.

is under no necessity whatsoever.

As this, He

As completely Free, He
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can do whatever He pleases.

He cannot be held accountable

for His acts by man.
c.

History - History has no rational connections.

Rather, it is a teleological development.

History is car-

ried out minutely according to the decrees of God.

It is

rational development only by the fact that God can be realized rationally, as a Sovereign Person and as such He can
decree as He wishes.
d.

Revelation- Revelation is the originally in- .

spired autographs of the Books of the Bible.

There is also

a secondary revelation in nature which makes all men responsible, but the supreme revelation of God occurred in
the person of Jesus Christ.
e.
Bible.

Biblical Criticism - There are problems in the

However, these problems are on trifling points which

are of little importance to the radical truths of revelation.
Lower criticism is to be commended in its efforts to find the
correct texts, since it has helped to solve many of the difficulties raised by higher criticism.

The basic fault of

higher criticism is that it approaches the Bible with an
antagonistic philosophy, which inevitably decimates its real
character.
f.
worlds.

The World -This is the best possible of all

This is the world -which God Himself ordained.

The

question of whether or not finiteness does of itself signify
that it is sinful is left ambiguous due to conflict in the
use of irreconcilable terminology.

/
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g.

Evil - Evil and sin have been decreed by God.

As Absolute Sovereign, nothing could occur in history, unless God had decreed it.
God in history.
h.

There is no surd or antinomy to

He sustains and orders it all.

The Image of God - The Image of God in man,

as far as formal structure is concerned, is retained.

It

enables men to comprehend the good, the true, and the beautiful as he sees it in sensory experience.
i.

Theology - A right theology cannot be avoided.

Man's rational nature demands that he systematize.

However,

theology cannot be considered an end in itself, but simply
as the means by which people are brought to a relationship
with God.
j.

Faith - Faith is personal commitment.

the act of becoming the truth.
reason.

It is

It is the highest act of

It is its logical resultant.

Reason has commanded

us to have faith.
k.

Reason - Reason is the ability of the mind to

make predications concerning reality.

Whether these

respond to reality or not is the test of reason.

cor~

Reason

itself is not sufficient to give one a complete philosophy
due to the fact that man has neither sufficient time nor experience to formulate completely unaided such a philosophy.
Special revelation, appealing to the reason, completes man's
philosophy.

It is this philosophy which sustains faith, for

man cannot commit himself to that which he does not know.
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C.

CONCLUSIONS

Barth averred that reason has no relationship to faith.
The Word of God which speaks to man, carries a message, but
hmv it is apprehended is left in doubt.

The 1tlord of God

comes home to the individual and is understood by the thought
of faith.

But yet this thought of faith does not conceive

the Word of God as it really is.

That this thought of faith

is also a thought of reason can be presumed.

But the message

is a message which comes when his own reason has expended
itself.

It is the voice of God grasped by faith when man

is in despair.
Brunner asserted that there is a positive as well as
a negative relationship between faith and reason.

It is

positive because man must be rationally . convinced of the
necessity to learn by faith.
in the right light.
true meaning.

He has not understood himself

He has not understood the world in its

He is -yrrong.

In this hour of desperateness,

the Word of God comes to him by faith.

Though this message

must pass through the rational comprehension, yet the act
of faith, the complete trust in God, must follow or the revelation is in vain.

Then, and then only, is man able to see

the world around him as it really is.

He truly then knows

the Lordship of God.
Carnell stated that reason is the basis of faith.
one commits himself he does so as a rational act.
himself because he knows God rationally.

As

He commits

It is not a leap
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into the unknown to have faith in God.

One must know a

great deal about God before he places himself into a position of complete trust.
All three men agree that faith is different than reason.

It implies the act of personal commitment and trust.

In this assertion, one cannot help but feel a healthy emphasis away from the cold, non-commital attitude of modern
liberalism.

At least proffered help is recognized.

no longer man's complete reliance upon

It is

hi~self.

The question which must plague Carnell, and everyone
who has read him, is whether the God whom he described is
really worthy of commitment and trust.

After he has esta-

blished that God is a Sovereign Person and does what He wills
one feels that Carnell has moved toward the very brink of
the irrational.

But \vhen he informed us that God decrees

both the good and the evil, that He is not answerable to any
laws, seemingly not even His mm nature, the definite impression is that the brink has been passed.

Rationally, one

is convinced that he really does not know much about such
a God •
. An interesting point of comparison between Carnell and
Brunner is that the former asserted that reason supports
faith while the latter asserted that faith supports reason.
Basic to these two concepts is the fundamental idea which
reason conveys.
Carnell does not.

Brunner has the Kantian concept of reason,
They differed on one very important point.
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Carnell asser ted that the reality which reason perceives is
very real.
ality.

Reason is merely the perception of truth in re-

Hence the Good, the True, the Beautiful, Time,, and

Space are really existent.

They are not merely categories

of the mind which are appended on to that which is real.
Thus reason does not change nor limit reality, but enables
man to see things as they are in the objective world.

Hence,

. one can see hmv both Barth and Brunner 1vould hesitate to allow man to comprehend anything of God with his Reason.

For

reason is a limiting concept to them.
As a point of positive compar±son, one can compare the
attitude of Carnell toward Science and Brunner toward reason.

Faith, according to Carnell can set Science right.

It

points out the path which makes Science constructive rather
than destructive.

Science alone cannot b1ow this.

The same

could be said concerning Brunner's concept of what faith
does for reason.
Some Conservatives have objected to the Nee-Orthodox
view of revelation because of its subjectivity. Both c. F.
H. Henryl and Nobel V. Sack 2 are in this category. They
would seriously question the superiority of revelation as
1. c. F. H. Henry The Protestant Dilemma (Grand
Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdman's Publishing Company, 1949),
p. 107.
.

2. Nobel V. Sacl{, "Brunner 1 s Concept of Revelation
and Reason," (unpublished term paper presented to Northern Theological Seminary, Chicago, Illinois, n.d.),
p. 41.
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it is given to man in Neo-Orthodoxy and as revelation has
appeared in Modernism.

How can one know whether the divine

message is revealed or whether man is elevated?
has become man, or man become Gods?

Whether God

Witnout some sort of

objective criteria one cannot know this.

Fundamentalists

claim to have this criteria within the Bible which is Revelation.

This whole question is of quite some embarrassment

to the Neo-Orthodox.

With their transcendent doctrine of

God as the Wl1olly Other, how can He become Immanent?

On the

other hand, if God does not become Immanent, why have God at
all, for man would never be able to know Him.

They attempt,

therefore, to avoid the difficulty of Modernism, by segregating faith from reason.

Thus God is not comprehended by an

elevation of reason as in Modernism, but an elevation of
faith.

In this way, God is brought under no limitations, but

is still sovereign person.

And after all, they might point

out , all certainty is ultimately subjective.

If certainty

is not subjective, then it is not certainty at all.
But the detachment made between faith and reason will
inevitably lead into far worse difficulties.

Neo-Orthodoxy,

by severing God from all rational connection with the world,
has unloaded the possibility of disavowing God Himself.
God at all who speaks?
impulse?

~fuy

Why

not some subjective non-rational

Jean-Paul Sartre, a French Existentialist, has made

this point forcibly.

His existential philosophy is very

similar in content to that of either Barth or Brunner.

Man
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is placed in the world, in the midst of difficulties and
problems which have no rational solution.

In this perplex-

ity, man is forced to choose, and in choosing, he is choosing
what he wishes all men to be.

But does not God present to

us a message which might help man to know and to choose that
which is right?

Of this Sartre says it would make little

difference.
Anguish is evident even when it conceals
itself. This is the anguish that Kierkegaard
called the anguish of Abraham. You know the
story: an angel has ordered Abraham to sacrifice his son; if it really were an angel who
has come and said, "You are Abraham, you will
sacrifice your son," everything vlould be all
right. But everyone might first \'/onder, 11 Is
it really an angel, and am I really Abraham?
What proof do I have?" There was a madwoman
who had hallucinations; someone used to speak
to her on the telephone and give her orders.
Her doctor asked her, "Who is it who talks to
you? 11 She answered, 11 He says it ' s God. 11 What
proof did she really have that it was God?
If an angel comes to me, what proof is there
that it's an angel? And if I hear voices,
what proof is there that they come from heaven
and not from hell, or from the subconscious,
or a pathalogical condition? What proves that
they are addressed to me? What proof is there
that I have been appointed to impose my choice
and my conception of man on humanity? I'll
never find any proof or sign to convince me
of that. If a voice addresses me, it is al\vaysfor me to decide that this is the angel's
voice; if I consider that such an act is a
good one, it is I who ,.,ill choose to say that
it is good rather than bad.3
This is further clarified in another portion of his work.

3. Jean-Paul Sartre, Existentialism, trans. by Bernard
Frechtman (New York, Philosophical Library, 1947),
pp. 22-2lr.
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From these few reflections it is evident
that nothing is more unjust than the objections that have been raised against us. Exis~ ·
tentialism is nothing else than an attempt to
draw all .the consequences of a coherent atheistic position. It isn't trying to plunge man
into despair at all. But if one calls every
attitude of Q~belief despair, like the Christians1 then the word is not being used in its
orig1nal sense. Existentialism isn't so atheistic that is wears itself -out showing that
God doesn't exist. Rather, it declares that
even if God did exist, that would change nothing. There you've got our point of view.
Not that we believe that God exists, but we
think that the problem of His existence is
not the issue. In this sense existentialism
is optimistic, a doctrine of action, and it
is plain dishonesty for Christians to make
no t distinction between their own de~pair and
ours and then to call us despairing.
Here is a peculiar paradox.

Both Barth and Brunner a-

verred that reason can only lead to antinomies and atheism.
Here is the example of where complete, irrational, subjectivism also leads.

But Barth would maintain that these ir-

rational subjective suggestions must be a paraphrase of the
Bible.

But was not Barth's original choice of the Bible al-

so subjective?

Where did he get that?

And why does Brunner

choose Christ?

If both men were not rationally led to ac-

cept this, as they both deny, then this must have been a
subjective choice.

Then why are not all choices subjective

and leave God out of it all together?

In t his queer irration-

al world in which both the existentialist and

Neo~Orthodox

d\.rell, God cannot be proved rationally nor any other vray to

·4.

Ibid., p. 61.
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be a very necessary part of their construction.
D.

SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER INVESTIGATIONS

So many areas have :'lopened for further study it would
not be possible to list them all.

At best, it will only be

possible to classify some of the areas which could be further investigated.

Of course, one of the primary areas

~or

investigation would be a comparison in the different areas
of theology between the Conservative position of Calvinism
and the Neo-Orthodox theology.
Another area which should be investigated, would be
the adequacy of Arminian Christian philosophy.

Some of the

authors who have written in this field should be examined
as to the vital issues of the Divine Holiness and Sovereinty.

It has already been demonstrated how inadequate the

Conservative Calvinistic position is in these fields.
Another field of research suggested in this study, is
that of a serious consideration of the chief discrepancies
claimed in thetexts of the Bible by critics.

It should be

so forcibly presented that it would .determine for our time
whether or not it is possible either to resolve these discrepencies, or to leave them open for the consideration of
future generations.
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